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 FOREWORD
The Honourable Mr Justice R. N. J. Purvis,
Family Court of Australia,
Presidential Member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
A policeman on patrol duty who sees a person in the course o
f
committing an offence can act then and there, arrest the suspect, and h
ave him
charged at the nearest police station. The suspect is speedily brought before
a
magistrate preparatory to the trial process being implemented. Not so
with the
corporate suspect criminal. He will not be seen to be in the
course of
committing an offence, an arrest as such is the exception rather than
the rule,
and if, and when, an arrest and/or charge does take place it will only f
ollow an
extensive and time consuming investigation. The prospect of conviction is no
t
high.
On the assumption that corporate crime, both by and against companie
s
and their shareholders, creditors, or other interested persons is incr
easing—and
this all statistics seek to affirm—what steps can then be taken to
restrain, let
alone contain, this form of criminality?
Following on an examination of various areas of corporate crime as
considered in previous seminars of the Institute of Criminology—inc
luding
crime and the medical, legal and accounting professions—it
was thought
appropriate for there to be an opportunity afforded to t
hose involved in
prosecuting corporate crime, commenting upon it, detecting it
s occurence or
prospective occurence, implementing guidelines for self-regulation an
d enforcing
the same, to come together and discuss their experience in over
seeing and
policing this challenging ﬁeld of human digression.
The discussion paper of the Federal Law Reform Commissio
n on
‘Sentencing: Penalties’ drew, at paragraph 286, a distinct
ion between
investigation of corporate crime and enforcement of sanctions by regul
atory
bodies rather than by the police. There is an apparent trend towa
rds reliance
upon civil remedies and self-regulation rather than resort to
criminal
prosecution. Reasons there advanced for this tendency included:
0 a strong belief in, and reliance upon, self-regulation as a stra
tegy;
0 the availability of stronger and more effective civil than criminal
sanctions;
O the perceived unwillingness of sentencing authorities to use the sanc
tions
already available;
0 insufﬁcient staff and ﬁnancial resources;
Othe political power and superior resources of corporations an
d their
. executives;
0 general discomfort with the criminal law and the belief t
hat persuasion
rather than punishment is a more effective strategy to get complian
ce;
0 complexity of cases compared with the prosecution
of individual
offenders, both legally and in terms of the amount of forensic
activity
required.
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The general theme of the papers and comments given by participants at
the seminar on ‘Policing Corporate Crime’ are supportive of the perceived trend
noted in the discussion paper of the Law Reform Commission. The difﬁculty
experienced in attempting to contain corporate mal—practice within the
constraints of the prosecution procedure was illustrated by reference to recent
instances where there had been massive avoidance of taxation and where there
had been large amounts of money lost by creditors of companies consequent
upon alleged criminal negligence by officers of such companies. In some cases
the complexity compounded by an insufﬁciency of resources resulted in the
system being unable to cope and proceedings then terminated. But, it was said
that with the education of those who dictate policy consequent upon a demand
for action by those who have suffered harm and/or perceived a need for change,
it should be competent, if considered appropriate, to arrest this trend.
Recent developments illustrative of an industry endeavouring to contain
its own transgressors were outlined in the papers on trading in securities and
on futures. The obtaining of conﬁdential information and its use by a recipient
'for that persons own beneﬁt in maximising a proﬁt or minimising a loss and
its being detrimental to another, was instanced as was the practice of leverage
currency dealers taking a principal position against their clients, the same
resulting in a loss to the client being a proﬁt to the dealer. A dealer might let
losses mount and then close out the client’s contracts while the client was in a
loss situation. Proﬁtable contracts could be rolled over into new contracts with
the anticipation on the part of the dealer that a loss will result—matters for the
internal control and discipline or police action?
Self-regulation and the introduction and implementation of industry
codes of conduct can be of beneﬁt, but only if a regulatory agency whether
governmental or private, is sufﬁciently able to investigate breaches and impose
appropriate sanctions. The extent to which persuasion rather than punishment
is effective as a strategy to obtain compliance, whilst illustrated by the measured
success achieved by the National Companies and Securities Commission, is
dependent upon its acceptance by the members of an industry and a perception
of the consequences arising from non-adherence to the tenants of such code.
If self-regulation whether in industry, the professions, or commerce is
not effective as a policeman in containing corporate crime, then the criminal
process altered by procedure and substantive law to cope with the complexities
of the factual circumstances and the sophistication of the alleged perpetrator,
will be, if not the sole, then the prime instrument of enforcement.  
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PROBLEMS OF PROSECUTING CORPORATE CRIME
RESOUNDINGS FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HARBOUR
Terry Griﬂm and Bryan Rowe,
Griﬂin Rowe and Associates
We would like to thank the Institute of Criminology and in particular
Professor Fisse, for their continuing commitment to full discussion of
contentious legal issues. '
We have interpreted the topic somewhat liberally and have taken the
work ‘prosecuting’ to include investigation, preparation and actual presentation.
The paper is mainly centred around the experience we gained when employed
by the Special Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce and Federal Director of Public Prosecutions
Ofﬁce. It should notbe assumed that our comments are only of relevance to
the federal sphere or, indeed, that they are limited to corporate crime and the
public sector. It is our belief that corporate crime is as active, if not more so,
in the private arena. Large public companies, including banks and other ﬁnance
houses, insurance companies, credit card agencies and the like are extremely
attractive and, according to our research, vulnerable targets. Our commments
apply equally to civil and criminal litigation.
There can be little doubt that there is constant stream of frauds being
perpetrated in our society. Many of these frauds are unexceptional, at least in
the legal sense and are adequately dealt with by the criminal justice system.
Equally there are obviously many large, complex matters that seem to be
beyound the capabilities of the system. '
We have seen ﬁgures that suggest that the cost of organised fraud in the
federal sphere is somewhere between $11 and $87 per week to every tax payer.
Whatever the amount is, it is not some book entry, but the amount each
taxpayer is actually out of pocket, and those ﬁgures only take into account the
recognised trouble areas like Social-Security, the Tax Ofﬁce and Customs. You
don’t have to be Einstein to realise that there must be unidentiﬁed fraud in
major federal departments like Defence, in State Government departments,
Local Government areas, stock exchanges and commerce generally. It is amazing
that to date no-one has been able to provide an accurate estimate. But whatever
the ﬁnal ﬁgure is, the real cost must be absolutely staggering!
If these frauds exist, and we don’t think there is room for debate about
that, then they must be massive and complex (even if only the known ﬁgures
are used as a guide). In our view there is only one long term solution to the
problems created by major fraud but that is lateral one. Of course, there are
areas where law reforms can assist. Things like full disclosure of brief, trial
without committal, compulsory pre-trial conferences, trial by a judge without
jury and/or with expert assistance have been mooted. It behoves us all to do
what we can to ensure that useful reforms are achieved but in any given matter
we have to take the law\as we ﬁnd it, accordingly, in the short term we have to
be most concerned with ﬁnding solutions within the present structures.
The management of really large criminal cases has always been a
headache for all involved. Almost invariably these cases have been fraud related
document matters. Investigators have ranged their very limited resources against
seemingly impossible tasks, prosecutors have strained to push the cases into
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traditional and recognisable shapes, defence lawyers have railed at the
difﬁculties presented to them and the courts have attempted to do the
impossible and handle the cases promptly within the existing frameworks.
In civil cases the problems have been similar but economic
considerations take on much greater importance. Major complex litigation can
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in all, or any of, investigation, preparation
and presentation. Efﬁcient management is crucial. Many organisations cannot
afford major litigation and some are obviously not convinced of the cost
effectiveness of legal action. A survey conducted in Victoria in 1986 found that
two out of three companies that had experienced fraud took no legal action. It
has been suggested that it is sounder commercially to pay criminals to stay away
from an enterprise than it is to take security measures and use the legal system
if they fail. We have some difﬁculty with the morality of such an approach but,
more importantly, we don’t accept that it represents good commercial sense in
today’s environment. We are sure the N.R.M.A. for instance will tell you that
every fraudulent claim paid will generate at least another ﬁve similar claims.
Whilst there were only a handful of really large cases every couple of
years the administration of justice did not suffer too much. No doubt
individuals from all sides suffered a great deal but the system coped, even
though you could be excused for wondering how many major cases were left in
the too hard basket.
However, times have changed. Society generally is becoming more
sophisticated and electronics have revolutionised the handling of information.
Both the quality and the quantity of information available to the public has
reached staggering proportions. The technology has not been totally ignored by
either law enforcement agencies or their quarry. Indeed, it is relatively common
for major cases to have electronic assistance.
The end result of all this is, in our opinion, that the system is breaking
down. Even where investigators, prosecutors and the courts act with all possible
speed, in some cases citizens accused of offences are being asked to defend
themselves years after the commission of the alleged offence/s. In a few notable
cases delays of over a decade have occured.
Clearly long delays are unfair to those accused of offences and
unacceptable to those charged with the administration of justice. The courts
have provided part of the solution by deciding that they will stay proceedings
where there has been unjustiﬁable delay. Delay can constitute harsh and
oppressive conduct such as to render proceedings an abuse of process. As a
byproduct of the courts’ move to protect the basic rights of defendants they
have created, perhaps inadvertantly, a situation where all agencies will have to
re-evaluate their old matters; and they will have to be very carefully examined
indeed. Many should never see the light of day. That is not to say that these
cases should be buried away in bottom drawers. They should be analysed, where
necessary by independent experts and ﬁnal, public decisions taken about their
fate.
The importance of several recent cases cannot be underestimated. Of
course, we are speaking about Gill v. McGregor and Herron v. McGregor which
together are commonly known as the Chelmsford Hospital case and Whitbread
v. Cooke and Purcell v. Cooke which are known as the Cambridge Credit case.
The decisions in these landmark cases were handed down in the later part of
last year and the principals established have been applied in several notable
cases since.
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Although both matters are no doubt becoming well known, it will not
hurt to touch on the facts and summarize the practical effect of the authorities—
The Chelmsford Hospital case arose out of the much publicised deep sleep
therapy disciplinary proceedings undertaken by the Disciplinary Tribunal
constituted under the Medical Practitioners Act 1928 against some of the
doctors involved in the treatment.
The allegations of misconduct depended on proof of acts and Omissions
which allegedly occurred in the years 1973, 1976 and 1978. Complaints were
laid in 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986. The investigating committee set up under
the Act found that a prima facie case had been made out on all complaints on
11 March 1986.
In reaching the conclusion that the delay had been such as to support a
stay of proceedings the Court found inter alia—
Once knowledge of the facts exist, one cannot stand by and allow time to
pass.
‘The public interest requires that complaints be lodged and dealt with as
expeditiously as possible’
The case also supports the view that delay is to be judged objectively,
and that the total delay between discovery of the facts and ﬁnal disposition is
the relevant delay. ‘
The Cambridge Credit case reinforced and extended the principles set
out in the Chelmsford Hospital matter. Brieﬂy the facts in the matter were as
follows; From 1966 to 1974 Cambridge Credit Corporation grew to a massive
conglomerate with seventy-ﬁve subsidiary companies and a wide range of
business activities across Australia. In September 1974 a Receiver was
appointed and in February 1975 the Attorney General appointed a C.A.C.
inspector to investigate the matter. The ﬁnal report was delivered in 1980 and
steps then began to prepare a prosecution case. Charges were laid in 1985 and
the hearing began in 1986.
It should be clear that this was a big case. One C.A.C. oﬂicer described
it thus—
the collapse of Cambridge was so big an event and the elements leading
to its collapse so multifarious that those involved in the conduct of the
prosecution have been simply bemused by the size of the thing. My own
perception of the matter which took about 4 weeks to form, was that the
thing was the size of an elephant and I was like a small boy wandering
around it wondering where I should begin to take hold.
That, of course, is a very understandable reaction, but we suggest that
there are ways to avoid the problems created by such a limited perspective. At
least, in the first instance, all large and dangerous things are best observed from
a reasonable distance, otherwise panic and thoughts of self preservation are Want
to set in.
I will mention some of the facts that emerged from the case that
contributed to the delay and eventual downfall of the matter. None of these
will be novel to those of you who have had the resposibility for managing large
litigation—
Investigators resigned and were not replaced for several months, they then
' had to familiarize themselves with the matter.
 Ofﬁcers could not be devoted solely to the one case.
Counsel changed, took silk, etc., and had to be replaced.
Counsel requested expert opinion on aspects of the matter.
Counsel took many months to provide advice.
Requests for additional staff were made but not met.
Inadequate word processing facilities were available.
Photocopying resources were inadequate.
General ﬁnancial restrictions were in place.
Clerical support was inadequate.
From the current authorities it is possible to make the following points
in summary form:
The Supreme Court has inherent power to prevent an abuse of process in
both civil and criminal cases.
The court will investigate circumstances leading to the institution of
proceedings regardless of bonaﬁdes.
Delay in instituting or prosecuting a matter can constitute harsh and
oppressive conduct and can render such proceedings an abuse of process.
In Australia at the moment long delay per se is probably not enough to
bar action but it will certainly base enquiry into cause. The prosecution can
attempt to justify delay but justiﬁcation is not the same as explanation. The
following are unlikely to be considered justiﬁcation:
Delay caused by an overcrowded court system. This includes delays caused
by lack of courts or transcript.
Ineﬂiciency of the prosecution team. Including inefﬁciencies beyond the
control of the person or authority ostensibly .in charge of the case.
Complexity of the inquiry and preparation of the case even where proper
attention is given to the inquiry. (The proper question is unfairness to the
accused.)
Co-accused involved in other proceedings.
The court will look objectively at the facts and will not accept the
prosecutors subjective view of proper expedition in a matter.
Even where unavoidable delay in bringing on the hearing can be foreseen,
proceedings should be instituted promptly.
Earlier we suggested that by their attitude to delay, the courts had
provided part of the solution. Old and mismanaged cases will not be heard. At
least as far as the citizen is concerned the court’s approach ensures some justice.
But the solution creates great pressure on the law enforcement agencies. Without
massive injection of resources, which seems unlikely in the short term, or a
highly streamlined approach it is possible the only way most major cases will
end is with an application to stay proceedings.
Investigators, prosecutors and administrators, require a much less
dramatic solution. There is a real need for those persons who are prepared to
ﬂout the criminal law on a major scale to be brought to book. Equally there is
a need for those civilly wronged to be able to obtain redress. No society that
can deal with petty offenders against its rules but cannot effectively handle
major transgressors can expec‘gto prosper. Not very long ago we heard a popular
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rumour to the effect that to avoid prosecution, if not detectibn, criminals only
had to operate on a sufficiently large scale. The artiﬁcially created paper chase
is a well known device of both the criminal and commercial world, we have to
have systems that can render it ineffectual where necessary. It will not beneﬁt
any one of us in the long run if that rumor becomes fact.
What then is to be done
We suggest that there are short term solutions. Not universal solutions
and not absolute solutions but methods and attitudes and applications of current
technology that can overcome many of the problems.
Before advances are able to be made, many, if not all, preconceived ideas
have to be forgotten. The methods we all developed over the last decade or' so
to deal with the harder cases have to be revised—
Firstly we must look at the use of resources. Resources are difﬁcult to
obtain in most areas but they are completely wasted if they are inadequate
for the task in hand. In these troubled times, half a job, three-quarters of
a job, or even nine-tenths of a job is not better than none.
Secondly it is important to reappraise the traditional approach taken to
the gathering of evidence. It is not vital that every available piece of
evidence is collected, collated and evaluated. . . not every witness has to
be proofed, spoken to or even identiﬁed. Quite clearly if that is attempted,
even a merely large case, will soon become out of control and worse,
uncontrollable.
Thirdly not every criminal has to be caught and charged and there is no
obligation to throw the proverbial book at those who are charged. It is of
little value to the community’ if all the players in a fraud are investigated,
arrested and charged but the system is unable to handle the additional steps
necessary to obtain convictions.
Our experience with major case management involving corporate crime
was gained from the time we joined Roger Gyles in late 1982. It continued
unabated until we resigned frdm the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
in early 1987. We have experienced the ‘pre-Gyles’ era, the ‘Gyles’ era and the
‘post-Gyles’ era.
The office of Special Prosecutor towhich Roger Gyles was appointed in
September 1982 was established to investigate and prosecute those involved in
the tax avoidance schemes colloquially known as the ‘bottom of the harbour’
schemes. After initial problems, the resources available to that ofﬁce were quite
remarkable, at least by comparison to those that had hitherto been available in
the federal sphere and in law enforcement agencies generally. We do not believe
that the reasons for this commitment are open to debate; there was strong
political commitment. many will remember the lead up to the federal election
which saw Robert Hawke become Prime Minister and recall— ‘
The McCabe/Lanfranchi report;
The black box sales tax scheme;
The allegations, by both the media and the opposition, of government
1nact1v1ty;
The Government response; and
The Costigan revelations.
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Political parties went out of their way to promise action and
commitment, and why wouldn’t they? The bottom of the harbour schemes alone
involved over 6 000 companies and about $800-$900 million in fraud on the
Commonwealth. From humble, tentative beginnings in the early 1970’s it had
become probably one of the largest growth industries by the end of the decade.
The media kept tax avoidance an issue and although not pursued as rigorously
these days, the topic is still revived from time to time. It should not be forgotten
that the bottom of the harbour schemes were not the only ones around at the
time. It would be naive to think, that because there is no current hue and cry,
organised tax avoidance/evasion has ceased or is on the decline.
The Special Prosecutors Ofﬁce provided an opportunity for those
involved to investigate and prosecute massive documentary cases without the
crippling effect of completely inadequate resources. Over 500 search warrants
were executed and literally millions of documents were seized or otherwise
obtained. The ofﬁce operated on a multi-discipline team approach; combining
lawyers, police ofﬁcers, taxation ofﬁcers, ﬁnancial investigators and clerical
support staff in operational groups. A management committee comprising the
Special Prosecutor, two senior lawyers, the senior police ofﬁcer, the senior
taxation ofﬁcer, the executive officer and counsel assisting was established and
met frequently. The marriage of the assorted disciplines worked quite well
although it was necessary to devise procedures to assist the resolution of
disputes between the teams, members of the teams and various disciplines.
In our experience the most difﬁcult dilemma arises out of the need to
make the right legal/management decisions. They are the key to major case
management and the importance of having the best possible operators making
these decisions cannot be overstated. They take experience, practice and often
a lot of intestinal fortitude.
However, once those decisions have been made, and remain to be
implemented, we believe the single most useful weapon available to attack major
investigation and litigation work is the computer. Used only like a card index
a computer can provide signiﬁcant support, used properly it can be formidable.
Even the smallest personal computers can be useful but a moderately powerful
machine with a reasonable data base and a well structured retrieval system can
save a massive amount of effort. And effort is time . . . and time is very much
of the essence.
As a federal ofﬁce we had free access to a very large FACOM computer
located in the Attorney General’s Department in Canberra. The system that was
originally installed operated on a full text retrieval system called STATUS which
is very similar to the STAIRS software developed by I.B.M. and used fairly
commonly around Sydney. We set up a series of data bases designed to
compartmentalise the information we had, or hoped to get. The idea was that
these data bases were to be loaded on a full text basis with all the documents
we obtained during the investigation. We used multiple word processing
terminals to capture data, running double shifts of twenty-ﬁve operators in
Sydney for most of the 2-year term, and relayed the information to the
mainframe in Canberra electronically every night.
Clearly there are difﬁculties with using computers, everyone is aware of
the horror stories, many have had an unwanted role in them. However, we
believe the incredible technical progress and the learning process of the last few
years make them mandatory equipment. When we were in the Special
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Prosecutors Ofﬁce we were told we had a perfect system. We believed all we
had to do was enter our data, shufﬂe it around and then press the print button
and out would come the answers to all our questions. Ignorance was bliss—of
course, it didn’t work. We fell into a lot of traps, some we knew about, like the
need to ensure data integrity, but didn’t then know what steps were necessary
to achieve satisfactory accuracy. Others were less obvious but equally basic. For
example we accepted a system with full text retrieval, it was enormously
powerful but we had such a mass of material that it was not possible to capture
it all, despite the fact we had 25 data entry operators working on shifts. One
afternoon we made a decision not to attempt to put in the material seized in
one police operation. We worked out that the decision saved 80 years input
time. That was fairly important, the Special Prosecutor’s commission was only
for 2 years.
One of the most difficult questions facing those about to construct a data
base to support major litigation is what form should the retrieval system take.
'In some matters you may want to be able to recover all or any of the
information entered in to the system in a variety of ways, some not even
thought of. A full text retrieval system like STATUS where every piece of
information has its own ‘address’ can be manipulated in almost limitless ways.
The I.B.M. STAIRS program has similar capacity. Equally you may only want
a limited number of identiﬁable reports with nothing more than an alpha sort.
In this case most of the good word processing programs would sufﬁce. You have
to consider time and resources. . . its no good attempting to set up a huge
unstructured data base which requires skilful searching if there is not time to
get the material into the system, or perhaps, to train staff in searching
techniques. That may sound obvious but it is difﬁcult to obtain reliable advice
about the capacity of any system. By the same token the strictly formatted
approach requires much greater intellectual input at the initial data capture stage
but it makes for much easier retrieval. One of the great debates in this area
went on between Mr Costigan Q.C. and Mr Gyles Q.C. and their staff. Mr
Costigan (or at least Douglas Meagher Q.C.) strongly advocated the use of
formatted material. Although oversimpliﬁed to make the point, the approach
was something like this: his ofﬁcers examined documents, made judgements
about the contents and where appropriate provided summaries for capture. Only
a small proportion of the available material was held on the computer. From
an investigator’s point of view the primary objection to the approach was that
at the early stages when the ofﬁcers were looking at the documents they didn’t
necessarily know enough to recognise all important information and once
summarised it was unlikely to see the light of day again. Of course, there were
also problems guaranteeing consistency between the various ofﬁcers. A major
objection from the information management point of view was the restriction
on information retrieval.
The approach taken by Special Prosecutor Gyles was diametrically
opposite. All the information was put into a very powerful system in a raw form.
The idea being that it would be available at all stages of the investigation, the
intellectual input would come in towards the end of the investigation when
sophisticated search techniques would be used to retrieve required information
in a useful form. Whilst the approach answered the objections to the previous
system, as we said earlier it was unworkable because of the volume of material
on hand and unrealistic expectations about input rates. Recent studies on full
text retrieval systems have concluded that, at least, when dealing with major
cases, the effective retrieval rate is about 25 per cent. Sufﬁce to say that a
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compromise between the two provides a satisfactory starting point for most
designs, but because of the importance of the question and the horrendous
consequences if an inapt approach is used, the problem has to be carefully
considered.
The bottom of the harbour work commenced by Roger Gyles Q.C., was
carried on by the newly appointed Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Ian
Temby Q.C., when Mr Gyles’ term expired in 1984. The balance of our
experience with computers in the public sector occurred in the Sydney ofﬁce of
the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) where we spent most of our time'
, post-Gyles. The D.P.P. in Sydney, now an ofﬁce of around 150 people, operated
out of the premises previously occupied by the Special Prosecutor, so the
automated Litigation Support System (L.S.S.) developed in the S.P.O. was
already in place. When the D.P.P. assumed responsibility for the mass of
prosecution work previously carried on by the Attorney General’s Department
we decided to :use some of our data processing capacity to handle ﬁle
management. As a result of a lot of hard work by some of the staff and
cautionary tales from those of us who had survived the Gyles experiments the
system now in place is an excellent advertisement for ADP. systems as
management tools. For completeness I should say the D.P.P. also uses several
small structured packages to provide assistance with revenue fraud matters and
in the civil remedies area.
It is our view that the introduction of automated data processing into
the law generally and L.S.S. particularly is inevitable. There are a plethora of
reasons why this should be so, but if any of you doubt it, ponder the history of
the workhorse of the ofﬁce photocopier. Today they are common place, taken
for granted, yet when they were ﬁrst introduced into commercial use they met
with tremendous resistance, they were labelled unreliable, uneconomic and
generally untrustworthy—a familiar cry. The same probably applies to
calculators, dictaphones, word processing machines and commander telephones.
The sheer volume of documentation in major fraud cases is,such that
without automated assistance these cases would be under investigation and
preparation for inordinately long periods of time. Many matters would be stayed
as a result of the principles enunciated in.cases like Cambridge Credit. In short,
without automated assistance these matters probably cannot be dealt with in
an efﬁcient, effective and appropriate manner.
The following summary of the development of computer support systems
in cases we have been involved in may be of some assistance to others faced
with similar tasks in the future. Originally we identiﬁed the tasks to be
performed as: ' .
(1) record property and identify relevant document types;
(2) analyse documents; .
(3) present a subset of the documents as a ‘brief’ of evidence tocourt.
'The approach initially taken, to perform these tasks, with necessary
variations from case to case, was basically as follows:
(1) Document lists (prepared by Word Processing) were produced. These
lists contained information such as the document number, type, name
and some textual data. This was usually followed by . . .
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(2) Where appropriate, documents were entered in either a structured or
full text form into specially designed data bases in the STATUS
system. STATUS was then used for searching purposes. The following
difﬁculties occurred: (a) where more than one document detailing
similar information had been input and misspelling of names had
taken place; (b) where (due to inﬂexibility of STATUS) it became
necessary to update data and generate reports; (0) because the recall
rates for large textual systems are low.
However, as we gained more experience and reﬁned the systems the need
for full text searching became less and less and occupied only a minor
percentage of time taken on overall searching. The later cases adopted a more
ﬂexible approach and thereby avoided many of the problems previously
encountered. The S.P.O had a powerful Wang system and catalogue and
reference information about the documents were held on this system. The
document content itself, however, was still kept in textual form and transferred
from the'Wang to STATUS for searching purposes. This approach was reﬁned
even further as time went by. The catalogue and reference information support
was extended to incorporate data validation, reporting, enquiries and generation
of exhibit lists. Also the information kept on STATUS became more structured
according to document type, the case and the data subject. In STATUS, each
article (usually corresponding to a physical document) was consistently input
into structured data bases. The use of ‘key’ ﬁelds (which further structured the
data) also made it easier for searching, sorting and generating spreadsheets of
selected information. This was about the stage of litigation support in 1986 and
it probably represented the state of the art at that time.
However, we realised that even this approach had some problems. The
Wang utilities whilst better than STATUS were still very limited. It was still
difficult to validate data, link data from seperate ﬁles, add or delete ﬁelds and
generate all the types of reports investigators, lawyers and management required.
The STATUS data bases are perhaps as good as they can be. However, they
have limitations. The most obvious being their inability to handle structured
data. For example, some documents repesent information in a very formalised
way, e.g., Corporate Affairs Commission [C.A.C]. documents show the name,
capacity and relevant dates for people involved in companies. STATUS does
not take advantage of this structure and relatively, or what should be relatively,
straightfoward information cannot be as expeditiously retrieved as is possible.
Obviously this does not unduly concern the skilled users but it does necessitate
training and practise.
In summary, at the beginning all information was stored as free text (a
form of ‘photocopying’ the documents into the computer data bases) because
there was little indication, at that stage of the cases, what the documents
contained or what facts would be of interest or revelance later. As the matters
became more clearly deﬁned, the data bases were structured to an increased
extent to facilitate searching of relevant facts and to save on input time. It
became quite apparent relatively early that many lengthy documents (e.g., sale
agreements) were highly repetitive and that only select data was of interest (e.g.
date, consideration, parties, etc.). However, STATUS was still being used to
handle what was essentially structured databases. This allowed the DPP to take
advantage of all the facilities that a structured database system possesses while
retaining the enormous ﬂexibility of searching on STATUS.
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When time permitted a review of the system was undertaken and new
techniques applied. The need to review was made more important when the
D.P.P. became active in the area of Civil Remedies and consideration was being
given to using the power of the machines to assist in locating, freezing and
ultimately forfeiting the proceeds of crime. The techniques now involved rely
more heavily on analysis of the content of each document and class of
document. Information is predominantly entered in structured form rather than
full text. This is possible because a lot of the work now performed by the D.P.P.
involves documents of a formalised kind (i.e., they convey speciﬁc facts in a
standard form, e.g., bank statements, cheques, C.A.C. documents, memoranda
of transfer, etc.). The ofﬁce also acquired a development tool called SPEED 11
which improved the linking facilities and made data validation, report
generation, maintenance and modiﬁcation easier. This has made the search, link
and relate capabilities of the L.S.S. even more powerful particularly in analytical
and investigatiVe work. STATUS still retains a strong role because some data
demands full text entry, the majority of the staff are experienced in using
STATUS and competent with full text retrieval systems and STATUS is
available nationally, whereas the Wangs are not yet networked. For these
reasons the system is ‘backed up’ by reproduction of all material, both
structured and free text data on STATUS. Users can then search on either
STATUS or through the local Wang system. '
Our enquiries have not revealed a more effective system to assist
prosecutors and although that covers an admittedly small ﬁeld, our experience
during the developmental stages should prove useful to all players in any major
litigation. The power in the system is not just the function of having all the
information in an easily retrievable form, it comes from the ways in which the
information can be shuffled around and cross matched.
Computers would clearly assist the investigation and prosecution of
those involved in corporate crime in at least the following areas:
pre court document control;
records of exhibit/M.F.I.s;
witness control;
transcript;
case management; and
current awareness.
1. Pre court document control
, The foundation of any major case involving masses of paper is the
control of that paper.- If you do not have an effective control system you will
end up in a mess. We found that there is a need to ensure as far as possible
that investigation support systems are designed with litigation in mind, even
things as basic as ensuring compatibililty between systems. Until quite recently
it was a fact that the three major law enforcement agencies in the federal sphere,
the Australian Federal Police, the National Crime Authority and the Director
of Public Prosecutions Ofﬁce all used different computer support. Whilst data
bases used for investigation will usually contain far more information than is
required for a L.S.S., much of the information will be common. Statements from
witnesses and relevant details like addresses, availability, etc) will be recorded.
Documents, their contents, pedigree and source will be recorded, details of
activities conducted under statutory authority (search warrants/listening device
warrants, etc.) could be included. In short all the brieﬁng material will be held
in a machine readable form.
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If that material can be simply lifted off the investigators’ computer and
read by the prosecutor’s litigation support system there is an enormous saving
in both time and money—if a conversion program has to be written it will take
around 4 to 6 weeks even if all goes well, and all rarely goes well, especially if
‘there is a panic on.
A little less obvious is the need to capture the data in a form that will
facilitate dual use. For example, the system adopted by the investigators for
recording document source and continuity has to be adaptable to the later
requirements of prosecutorsand courts or all the information will have to be
rekeyed.
It is the need to control documents during all the pre-court shufﬂing that
makes the use of the litigation support systems important. In major document
handling exercises in the D.P.P. where no other system is in place, each
document is given a computer generated number. This number is keyed into
the data base and is used to record the source and all movements of the
document. It also forms the basis of a code within the L.S.S. for identifying the
relevance and importance of the particular document as the understanding of
the case develops. ,
2. Exhibits/MFIs
This is an area where the infallible memory of the machine is best
demonstrated and because of the heavily structured nature of the data, problems
‘ of retrieval that are apparent in full text systems, are not or should not be
apparent. Even so there are several matters that have to be addressed. The
prosecution has to be prepared to provide lists to the court and the defence,
accordingly the lists have to be absolutely accurate. The courts have to be
ﬂexible enough to allow for prepared exhibit lists that do not necessarily follow
the course of the evidence, and will often contain multi-lettered codes for each
article. These codes will often only be meaningful to investigators or prosecutors
but they have no sinister or unreasonable purpose. Although irrelevant, they
should be explicable. Usually consisting of numbers and letters that identify for
example—source, date, data capture, relevant charge, etc.
3. Witnesses
Obviously if you are using a L.S.S.‘ all witnesses will be entered. The
L.S.S. enables the details to be resorted in various ways to assist in whatever
planning is deemed necessary. It can provide check lists for subpoenae, write a
diary of available dates and sort them against court days, it can sort against
charges, record effectiveness or departure from proof, list all relevant documents
for a given witness, check all expenses have been paid. In short a properly set
up LS.S. can assist with all the little things that have to be done before during
and after a case—but it can do it all without error or overtime.
4. Transcript
There is room for considerable debate about the capture of transcript
in L.S.S. To date the only transcript we have seen on L.S.S. has been typed or
captured by optical scanners after the court transcript has become available in
hard copy. The evidence has been taken, reduced to writing, reiterated in
court—often the statements are produced, taken down either in shorthand or
by typewriter, reproduced and disseminated. THEN it is rekeyed into a L.S.S.
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There’s a lot of double handling. Personally we favour a system where the courts
key directly into a system that provides the material in a common machine
readable form. However, we saw little enthusiasm for any change within the
courts’ system. We could understand such an attitude if the transcription
services were effective, but there are many cases being held up for substantial
periods just because transcript is not available. Recently we were told that to
obtain a transcript in writing of the entry of default judgment would take 12
months. We ﬁnd such an obvious saving in time and materials in having the
court reporter typing straight onto a word processing machine that can provide
parties with the material in electronic form almost immediately, that we see
little arguments of merit that can be advanced by the detractors of the idea.
Such a system could be instituted without addressing the L.S.S. question. If the
transcript is to be taken in such a form that a L.S.S. could load it directly onto
a data base some thought has to be given to the structure. For example, if the
usual heading showing the parties is used on each page of the transcript it is
difﬁcult to sensibly search the data using one of those names. Likewise it is
necessary to provide key ﬁelds to allow simple searches for things like exhibits
and articles marked for identiﬁcation.
Proper handling of documents in court has always been a problem in
large cases. In some of the ‘bottom of the harbour’ cases we used overhead
projectors and large screens to display the documents to the juries. All the
relevant documents has been photocopied onto transparencies and were
displayed at appropriate times during the case. There is little doubt that this
sort of presentation speeds up hearings and enhances the understanding of the
jury. However it is expensive and labour intensive. What is requried is a system
whereby documents held in a L.S.S. data base can be identiﬁed and displayed
by use of a terminal in court. It is now relatively easy to generate a visual image
of any document held in a data base—in other words the technology is available
and whereas it was extremely expensive a couple of years ago there are now
small effective and cheap units on the market. One thing we should mention is
that it is possible to separate data bases within a L.S.S. thus enabling a single
system to be used for multiple purposes; for example in a case in Queensland
where the Supreme Court proved fairly receptive to computer assistance the
judge was provided with a terminal which had access to the S.P.O./D.P.P. L.S.S.
He had access to the transcript and to the exhibits/M.F.I.’s but all the
investigative material was locked off.
5. Case Matter Management Systems
Basically these systems are structured data bases that can be used for
daily management and control of ﬁles. Typically they can generate reports and
statistics in a variety of forms. They are excellent devices for preparation of
information in an arranged form, in a legal administration area things like
Parliamentary reports and comparative sentencing ﬁgures come to mind. (It
could easily incorporate any other statistics you may need in your particular
practice—cg, verdicts, number of trials, number of fraud cases, amount of
fraud, length of hearings, etc.) A good system acts as a ﬁle tracking device. It
enables you to ﬁnd out the current position of a matter. It also allows for
exception reporting on any number of matters including for example, matters
that have not been actioned for a period of time, court hearings that have not
been allocated or briefed and are pending, etc. It is a relatively simple system
to establish provided the proper staff are put on the task to ensure the ﬁelds of
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relevance to your particular type of work are identiﬁed and provided for. There
will be differences of emphasis between your requirements and those of another
ofﬁce organisation, court, etc. You must ensure that your ﬁelds are unambiguous
and clearly understood by your input operators.
These simply structured systems can be used to assist in many areas for
example: post-court procedures and diaries. If the system has been properly
structured and maintained, things like returning exhibits, paying witnesses, and
generating reports can all be done by the push of a button, If not done the
machine can alert you. Diaries are another area. It is easily possible for a
computer to organise your own or the court’s diary. All dates can be accessible
via terminals so parties can access the courts terminal and settle dates. The court
lists can be generated and maintained very effectively by machine.
There are other areas where the power of these machines could be very
useful; things like preparation of appeal books, compilation of sentencing
statistics and extraction of common material from a variety of cases come to
mind.
6. Current Awareness System
By this we mean a system to cope with specialist data along the lines of
CLIRS. We believe CLIRS is a valuable concept but at the moment it is going
through some teething problems. It may be that these problems will not be
overcome or that they will not be overcome before many users and potential
users have been turned off sufﬁciently never to return. One apparent problem
is the effectiveness (or lack of it) of retrieval in full text systems. Another is
that it may be too broad or cluttered for most users’ needs. Many lawyers
operate in specialist areas of practice. They do not need the enormous amount
of information that is stored in CLIRS and, indeed, it is probably not efﬁcient
in either cost or time for inexperienced operators to search through mountains
of material. What many of those involved in pursuing corporate crime want is
a subset of information relevant to their particular specialty. The on-going
development work by those behind CLIRS into such assistance tools as IQ and
RANKING of answers may assist but until the techniques are perfected and
veriﬁed and the cost is more affordable (currently we believe about $20,000)
you may consider the establishment of in-house data bases using experienced
lawyers to select matters for input and to preside over quality control. These
systems could be textual, structured or mere indexes leading to hard copies
stored in another area (e.g. the library). They could include such material as
advices, unreported judgments, office policies/directions, precedents pleadings,
material on obscure topics that are unlikely to feature in textbooks or authorised
reports. It may be that some people are involved in a developing area of the
law such that reports, text books may not catch up with developments for a
while and the most effective way to keep abreast or ahead of the pack is to
establish a specialised data base at least until matters stabilise (e.g., Mareva
injuctions, proceeds of crime, etc.).
One matter that must be addressed and constantly borne in mind is
security. To date security is a major problem which has not received the
consideration it deserves. This neglect has made all systems vulnerable and
extremely expensive to protect to any reasonable degree. The phenomena of
hackers is well known. But the problems have been recognised within the
industry and it is likely the machines will soon be able to recognise intrusions
and deal with them at least to the extent that the data is protected and the
attempted breach is recorded.‘
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In relation to computer support we caution against investigators and
lawyers being at the leading edge. There are many dangers in being at the
'forefront of technology. We also do not believe that systems should be
developed in isolation. In some respects there appears to be a competition going
on. In this area a united front and shared ideas are essential.
In this paper we have outlined some of our experiences and ideas for
the conduct of major fraud work. Hopefully, it provides some ideas for
investigators, prosecutors and others involved in this area. In case we have given
the impression that we believe A.D.P. systems provide most of the answers to
the problems of handling corporate crime; that is not the case. In the short term,
policy and legal management decisions are the most important. They have to
be right or everything else will be an exercise in futility.
However, we believe that in the long term, EDUCATION is the only
solution Whatever label you apply to the problem be it corporate crime,
organised crime or economic crime, the only effective answer lies in ensuring
the public are fully aware of the facts For what it is worth we believe the media
have the power and a responsibility to provide those facts.
Today an objective observer, noting the tremendous harm organised
criminal enterprise is doing to the economy and the people of Australia could
be forgiven for thinking either that there were no weapons available to ﬁght
these crimes or that there was no interest in deploying them; Clearly law
enforcement agencies are having only a limited effect—and without some
dramatic changes they will never be really effective. In practical terms the
available resources are completely inadequate, and some of the heralded
improvements provide nothing more than window dressing, it also seems clear
that there are people in authority who have no interest in deploying the weapons
and don’t care whether or not they are effective.
There are two very important questions that follow from the above;
firstly is it possible to establish effective measures against organised crime? and
secondly if it is possible why aren’t these measures in place and operating
successfully?
As to the ﬁrst point there is little doubt that adequate measures to
combat organised crime could be established. There would need to be a greater
commitment to modern devices, things like motor cars, telephone systems and
computers. Of course time and resources would have to be devoted especially
in relation to the introduction and programming of computers. Criminals are
using computers and engaging experts to advise them on programming and the
like. Attention must be given to compatibility and that the right systems are
put in place. People must be employed or used who understand law enforcement
and appreciate the requirements. It would require greater funding than is now
given and would be honestly unpalatable to some. The measures would certainly
receive a lot of attention from various special interest groups but there is
nothing new or mysterious about them. This country certainly has suﬂicient
people with the standing and expertise to design the powers and procedures that
would be necessary. Whether everyone would be happy or even prepared to see
the powers implemented15 yet another question.
One thing that has amazed commentators in America is the public
apathy about the organised crime problem. Australians appear no less apathetic
to the problem. Yet even assuming that this apathy may be related to the so
called victimless nature of organised crime and, in our case, to the notoriously
 
25
relaxed attitude attributed to many Australians, the degree to which this
community ignores organised crime is fascinating. There has been no shortage
of warnings. Royal Commissioners, judges, senior law enforcement ofﬁcers,
academics, and many others have attempted to get across the message that
ORGANISED CRIME HAS OR WILL INFILTRATE EVERY ASPECT OF
LIFE IN THIS COUNTRY UNLESS DRAMATIC STEPS ARE TAKEN TO
ERADICATE IT. Overseas experience points to this and most knowledgable
observers have conﬁrmed the trend. But no one, outside a small group, seems
to care. Why not? How can anything so serious be ignored. It can only be
because the public do not appreciate the extent to which they have become
victims of these victimless crimes. Therefore it must be part of the solution to
educate the masses. EDUCATION of the public is fundamental to any attack
on organised crime, starting with adult tax payers; once they accept that major
crime has an economic effect that they are paying for the lifestyle of the
criminals by tolerating a lower standard of living for themselves, perhaps then
their attitude will change. .
Action from the citizens has to be translated into action from the
politicians, but until public concern reaches the point where politicians believe
their very existence depends on a proper approach to this problem it is unlikely
anything really effective will be done. Organised crime relies on corruption of
those in power to further its ends. Quite obviously exposure of corrupt ofﬁcials
or members of a government can cause serious embarrassment. Accordingly it
is unlikely a government of any persuasion is going to welcome procedures that
probe too deeply. If it is possible to get away with it the best political answer
is to create the impression that something is being done without actually risking
votes—to lull the voters into a false sence of security. It is of course pathetically
easy to appear to be doing a great deal without achieving anything. One classic
method is to create a body to deal with a particular problem; shout about the
creation from the roof tops and then quietly let the body die from lack of
nourishment. Another old favourite is to establish a Royal Commission. Such
bodies always provide a mantle of respectability and, while they are current,
provided a convenient gag or cop-out. One can always say that the Royal
Commission is looking at that matter and that is the appropriate forum for it.
If a commission makes any serious recommendations it is always possible to
simply shelve them until a later stage when the debate has run its course.
We say that the ﬁrst step in the ﬁght against organised crime is the
reversal of the TANVIC principle. We coined the term TANVIC at a recent
seminar conducted by the Commonwealth Secretariat in a light hearted attempt
to get across a very serious message—that at present there are no votes in crime.
Many people may not realise this. Indeed when we were with Roger Gyles and
later with the D.P.P. we presumed that the issue of corporate crime was of great
importance to the public, that it swayed politicians, that it counted in elections.
All of our colleagues felt the same. We were wrong! Organised crime was not
an issue in the last Federal election despite some attempt by, at least, one group
to make it one. I believe that there is a tendency amongst most of us who know
the importance of the ﬁght against organised crime, who are part of the ﬁght
and who are therefore concerned about it—to believe that the community shares
our views and echoes our concerns. They certainly sh0uld! It is even probable
that they would—if the facts were fully and properly before them and if they
were kept in front of them. Once the reality is out, once everyone realises that
we are not dealing with modern day Robin Hoods but with cold, hard,
calculating and ruthless criminals—then and only then—will the POLITICIANS
\
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have to do something other than pay lip service to the problem. However, we
are not saying that if by some miracle a successful education program creates
a community of informed and concerned citizens that the ﬁght is over. That is
really only a necessary preliminary.
What has to follow is the implementation of a comprehensive strategy
that can be effective NATIONALLY. Like others we have given considerable
thought to the design of a proper strategy. However, there is little point in
pursuing any of these ideas until there is demonstrable political will and unity.
Promises of action, assertions that matters are being considered or suggestions
that we are getting on top of the problem will only serve to prolong the present
agony. ‘
This quotation from Alice in Wonderland is apt:
“If seven maids, with seven mops
Swept it for half a year
Do you suppose,” the Walrus said
“That they could get it clear?”
“I doubt it” said the carpenter
and shed a bitter tear.
 27
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Bryan Rowe
It may seem a little unusual for a solicitor from private practice to stand
up here and address you on this topic. I should perhaps explain for those of
you who know nothing more than that I am a partner in Grifﬁn Rowe &
Associates and am perhaps wondering why I am here. Let me provide a little
bit of background before I go into my speech.
Prior to the recent establishment of our practice I was a Senior Assistant
Director of Pubic Prosecutions in Ian Temby’s Sydney ofﬁce. My partner Terry
Grifﬁn was a Deputy Director in that ofﬁce and we both had been federal
prosecutors for some time. We also came to the D.P.P. from the ofﬁce of the
Special Prosecutor, Roger Gyles Q.C., where we had been dealing with the
bottom of the harbour tax avoidance cases. So I do have some credentials to
be here. Until the most recent Times on Sunday article I thought the one area
that was common to all commentators on commercial crime was that it
constituted a massive and a growing problem. If Ian Temby Q.C. was correctly
quoted in that newspaper he does not share this view, at least insofar as the
federal arena is conerned. If he is right in his assessment that he is on top of
the problem, and it would be great if he is, it is very comforting. It clearly
reduces the areas we all have to be concerned about. But despite that publicity
and some impressive recent coups by various law enforcement agencies we still
believe that there is a great deal of major commercial fraud around. However,
it seems that the amount of fraud and its cost to the community, are difﬁcult
to quantify. Funnily enough we were recently taken to task for repeating as a
possible guide a range of ﬁgures we had extracted from the Parliamentary
debates on the Australia card. The ﬁgures we used were much Starker and more
informative that those used in that debate because we translated them ‘into
dollars per week. We found that percentages of Gross National Product are apt
to be a wee bit confusing but then we were told that ‘no one knows how much
fraud is costing’. If that was not so serious it would almost be funny.
Of course, cost is only one of the unknowns about commercial crime
and that leads me to what we see as the long term solution and that is education.
We believe that informed debate is a necessary adjunct to the ﬁght against crime
generally. It is a matter of some regret that many who know what is happening
in this area are not prepared to speak out. Perhaps they are concerned about
the possible repercussions. Public servants are vulnerable, Costigan was roundly
criticised, Roger Gyles had some monumental brawls, and'even investigative
journalists seem to suffer. It is strange that in this society commentators that
publicly express concern about crime of any nature and suggest that more should
be done are immediately branded as ‘nutters’, ‘zealots’, ‘cynics’, ‘whistleblowers’,
or just plain uninformed. This seems to be particularly so if the commentator
has just left a job as a Royal commissioner, or as a judge, or as a senior law
enforcement ofﬁcer. Hopefully I will have time to touch on the long term
importance of education and informed debate before I close.
But ﬁrst to the short term. The problems facing those charged with
policing corporate crime are myriad and complex. Although there are special
difﬁculties in many areas there are also problems that are common to most
agencies. Things like limited inter-agency co-operation, poor case management,
and woefully inadequate resources seem to recur with monotonous regularity
as do ineffectual legislation and artiﬁcial boundaries. It would be simplistic to
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suggest that all or any of the problems can be solved by streamlining procedures
yet there are many areas where experience and careful planning can save both
time and money.
When we ﬁrst went to work with Roger Gyles Q.C. who was appointed
a Special Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the tax avoidance schemes
commonly known as ‘bottom of the harbour’ matters we were almost
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems we faced. It is no secret that
the resources eventually available to his ofﬁce were remarkable. At least in
comparison to other law enforcement agencies at that time. But in the early
days we had little to work with and a great deal to learn.
Much of the credit for the ﬁnal successes of the prosecutions must go
to Mr Gyles, but, as an aside, without political will, even he could not have
achieved much. The fact was that the tax avoidance schemes had become a
public issue, media generated awareness created a situation where the Special
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce had priority and throughout his term Mr Gyles maintained
quite a high media proﬁle.
For those involved his ofﬁce provided an opportunity to investigate and
prosecute massive documentary cases without the crippling effect of completely
inadequate resources. A rare luxury that presented an unique learning
experience. During its 2 years of operations the Special Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce
developed a highly specialised team of major case managers. Techniques for
employing multi-discipline teams in handling the masses of documents and
complex litigation were developed, reﬁned, and polished. Automated data
processing systems were designed and widely employed and I am happy to be
able to report that after much money, time, pain and suffering, these systems
actually worked effectively.
Towards the end of the term the better operators in, the ofﬁce could
control and direct the presentation of the cases almost regardless of size. It is
a shame that much of that experience has been lost, or at least is not being
fully utilised. Many of the people with the expertise which is certainly rare in
Australia, and may be equally rare in the rest of the world, are now spread
across various administrative jobs, assorted law enforcement agencies, and
private practices.
Just to refresh your memories the Special Prosecutor’s Oﬂice was
responsible for investigating tax avoidance schemes involving over 6 000
companies and about $800—$900 million worth of fraud on the Commonwealth.
During its time more than 500 search warrants were executed and literally
millions of documents were dealt with. The Ofﬁce operated with multi-discipline
teams involving lawyers, police ofﬁcers, tax ofﬁcers, ﬁnancial investigators, and
clerical support staff. I should stress that although the resources were substantial
they were not inﬁnite. The differences between the SP0 and most other law
enforcement agencies that are traditionally pleading for more resources was only
one of degree. There was no way that everyone involved in the schemes could'
be dealt with or even examined. Priority still had to be set, difﬁcult management
decisions about targets system and staff had to be made. Time was still the
enemy.
It is not difﬁcult to turn a small straightforward case into an old minor
disaster. However, it is very difﬁcult to prevent a large complex case from
turning into and old major disaster. When you are trying to manage these large
cases every step in the process from investigation to prosecution seems destined
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to maximise delay. For a variety of reasons IT TAKES TIME for most large
fraud 'matters to come to notice. Often the crimes are victimless in the sense
that all of the participants beneﬁt, in others the victims are unaware that they
have been victims. Frequently, especially where companies are involved
exposure as a victim may be seen as counter-productive. Onc‘e discovered, IT
TAKES TIME to investigate these complex cases. Investigators need to go to
the experts and expertise to identify the issues. Witnesses, those shy unaware
involved members of the public, are often difﬁcult to track down and seem to
suffer from either shocking memories or lack of knowledge. Some become
unavailable for bizarre reasons. One I had dealings with, married one of the
defendants the day before she was due to give evidence.
Repositories need to be identiﬁed, searched, and relevant evidence seized
or otherwise obtained. IT TAKES TIME to review the material to create
systems to manipulate the masses of information and to prepare the evidence
in a form that can be understood by prosecutors, courts, and juries. Finally, IT
TAKES TIME to get matters of this nature to and through the court system.
All the separate phases have to be carefully controlled. Where any one phase
takes over the case managers, and it happens frequently, the results can be
disastrous. Cases like the Chelmsford Hospital matter, Cambridge Credit, and
Negri River come to mind. Without strict controls the prospects of mounting
a successful prosecution in a major case are becoming quite remote. Clearly long
delays are unfair to those accused of offences, and unacceptable to those charged
with the administration of justice. The courts have provided part of the solution
by deciding that they will stay proceedings where there has been unjustiﬁable
delay. Accordingly all agencies will have to re-evaluate their old cases. But what
of today’s scams? They must not become the ‘too old’ cases of 1997. How can
they be effectively managed without a very unlikely massive injection of
resources?
We know of no panacea, but suggest there are some short term solutions.
Not absolute solutions but methods and attitudes and applications of current
technology that can overcome many of the problems. Before advances can be
made, many if not all, pre-conceived ideas have to be forgotten. Firstly, we must
look at the use of resources. Resources are difﬁcult to obtain in most areas, but
they are completely wasted if they are inadequate for the task. In these times
half a job, three-quarters of a job, or even nine-tenths of a job is not better
than none.
Secondly it is important to reappraise the traditional approach taken to
the gathering of evidence. It is not vital that every available piece of evidence
is collected, collated, and evaluated. Not every witness has to be proofed, spoken
to, or even identiﬁed. Quite clearly if that is attempted even a merely large case
will soon become out of control, and worse uncontrollable.
Thirdly not everyone involved in a given case has to be caught and
charged and there is no obligation to throw the proverbial book at those who
are charged. It is of little value to the community if all the players in a fraud
are investigated, arrested, and charged, but the system is unable to handle the
additional steps necessary to obtain convictions.
Fourthly it is imperative that senior managers maintain an accurate
overview, it is even quite useful if the case ofﬁcers themselves can stand back
far enough to see what they are doing. Of course the quality of your observers
has to be up to scratch. They must be unﬂappable, objective, and ﬂexible.
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Fifthly, more attention should be given to fraud prevention.
Traditionally both government and commerce seem to concentrate on detection,
investigation, and prosecution. Yet where proper preventive measures are taken
the incidences and cost of crime will be minimised. It is a pity that most
organisations are re-active rather than pro-active. In many cases quite simple
steps can prevent complex future problems.
In our experience the most difﬁcult dilemma arises out of the need to
make the right legal'management decisions. They are the key to major case
management and the importance of having the best possible operators making
those decisions cannot be overstated. They take experience, practice, and at
times a lot of guts. However once those decisions have been made and remain
to be implemented we believe one of the most useful weapons available to attack
major investigation and litigation work is the computer. Even the smallest
personal computer can be useful but a moderately powerful machine with a
reasonable data base and a well structured retrieval system can save a massive
amount of effort.
We deal with computers and our experience with them in some detail
in the paper. Computers can clearly assist the investigation and prosecution of
those involved in corporate crime in at least the following areas:
0 pre-court document control;
0 the records of exhibits and M.F.I’s;
O witness control;
0 transcript;
0 case management; and
0 current awareness systems.
I should stress that in relation to these devices we urge caution. Most
of us do not purchase ﬁve or six motor vehicles when one would sufﬁce. Most
of us do not blindly accept what we are told by sales staff, nor do we allow our
clerks or our secretaries to select our libraries for us. Yet when it comes to
computers many people seem to lose all reason. You would be surprised by the
number of people who come to us with tales of woe and most of it is easily
avoidable.
Please carefully consider your needs, assign a lawyer or an investigator
to determine what it is you want. If you do not have the expertise in-house
engage outside help but do not rush in. Hopefully, the ideas set out in our paper
will be of some use to all those involved in the area but we want to emphasise
that we are not saying that ADP systems solve the problem of corporate crime.
Clearly they do not. We do suggest that used properly they provide a very useful
tool. But if they are used badly they- will be hugely counter productive.
I would now like to take just a little time to return to the long term
importance of education and informed debate. We believe that in the long term
EDUCATION is the only solution. That the answer lies in ensuring that the
public is fully aware of the facts. For what it is worth we believe the media
have the power and a responsibility to provide those facts. Several weeks ago
in delivering a paper to a seminar on corporate crime organised by the
Commonwealth Secretariat I coined a new word “tanvic” in a lighthearted
attempt to get across a very serious message! that at present There Are No Votes
In Crime. It was the thrust of that paper that the only realistic, long term
weapon against organised crime was education. That there was a need to
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educate the public about the real cost 'of organised commercial crimes . . . but
that once they understood the facts, once they grasped that they were all victims
there would be an outcry and a widespread demand for action.
Action from the citizens has to-be translated into action from the
politicians, and until public concern reaches the point where politicians believe
their very livelihoOd depends upon a proper approach to the problem it is
unlikely that anything really effective will be done.
However, we are not saying that if by some miracle a successful
education program creates a community of informed and concerned citizens
that the ﬁght is over. That is really only a necessary preliminary step to ensure
the resources are available.
What has to follow is the implementation of a comprehensive strategy
that can be effective nationally. Like others we have given considerable thought,
to the design of a proper strategy. However, we believe there is little point in
pursuing any ideas until there is manifest political will and unity. Promises of
action, assertions that matters are being considered, or suggestions that we are
getting on top of the problem will only serve to prolong the present agony. I
thank you for attending and listening and hopefully later we will be able to deal
with any questions.
 INSIDER TRADING: TIPS FOR ENFORCEMENT
Robert Nicol
Executive Director (Operations),
Corporate Affairs Commission, N.S.W.
. During the past several months it has been difﬁcult to pick up a ﬁnancial
newspaper without ﬁnding some reference to insider trading. The Ivan Boesky
scandal in the United States has certainly brought insider trading to public
prominence. It is trite to say that insider trading is ﬂavour of the month.
However, before examining the Australian position it is important to fully
understand the policy and rationale behind the prohibition on insider trading.
The rationale behind the legislative prohibition is that, to the extent that
it is possible, the market shall have a free ﬂow of information. Consequently,
persons because of their positions or contacts are prohibited from dealing in
securities if they hold information which is not otherwise generally available.
It could be said that the provisions impose an impetus for persons to make price
sensitive information available. For example, ifI was the director of a large
public company, and I was aware of a very favourable contract which is likely
to increase the value of the stock prima facie I am prohibited frOm dealing in
those shares. Therefore, if I wanted to trade I can only do so legally by making
the information generally available.
The prohibition on insider trading is contained in s. 128 of the Securities
Industry Code— ‘
A person who at any time in the preceding 6 months has been connected
with a body corporate, is prohibited from dealing with its securities where
he has acquired information in connection with this position, which is not
generally available, but if it were, it would materially affect the price of
securities: 5. 128 (l).
The prohibition on insider trading extends to dealings in any securities of
any other body corporate by a person connected with a body corporate,
where he gains information by reason of that connection, which is not
generally available and which materially affects the price of the securities
of the other body corporate: s. 128 (2).
A person may also be prohibited under s. 128 (3) from dealing in
securities, where he obtains information from insiders who are themselves
prohibited from dealing in the securities by s. 128 (1) and (2).
Persons who are prevented from dealing in securities under s. 128 ( 1), (2)
and (3) are also prohibited from causing or procuring others to deal in
those securities: s. 128 (4).
A person who is precluded from dealing in securities under s. 128 (l), (2)
and (3) is prohibited from communicating insider information to any
person, where the securities are listed on a stock exchange and know or
ought reasonably to know that the other person will use that information
in dealing in the securities: 8. 128 (5).
A corporation is also prohibited from dealing in any securities, if an oﬂicer
of that corporation is himself prohibited from dealing in them: 5. 128 (6).
(However, see 3. 128 (7)).
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Unfortunately, people who we believe engage in insider trading do not
leave a readily discernible trail. We believe that they seek to hide their
transactions through a convoluted and tangled web. Tracing the movement of
the securities, one would think, is a relatively easy task. Say we are dealing with
shares traded on the stock exchange. First we would go to the stock exchange
and they would tell us who the broker was, who was involved in the transaction.
Then we would ﬁnd out who the broker acted for. If the client is a natural
person, so much the better. We can go out and interview this person and that
person on ﬁnding out that the Corporate Affairs Commission is hot on the trail
of an insider trading prosecution, would no doubt throw his or her hands up,
confess all, turn in their accomplices and the case is solved.
However, in real life it may be a little more complicated. We have found
that people have sought to hide their activities in many ways. There was the
case reported to the Commission of an unusual movement in shares prior to a
signiﬁcant announcement being madeconceming the company. An analysis of
the share trading showed one broker to be very active and that broker’s script
ledger card was inspected to determine the names of his clients. A client was
selected who had purchased shares before the announcement and sold some of
those shares after the announcement. Investigators went to this client’s address
at Kings Cross only to ﬁnd no such address existed. The investigator went back
to the broker’s ofﬁce and checked the cash receipt sheets only to ﬁnd that this
client had paid in cash, and that for the shares that had been sold the broker
had paid the client with a cash cheque. The investigator, assuming that a false
name and address had been used, realised that the client could not receive a
share certiﬁcate so it was obvious that the client would have to have had the
shares registered in the name of the broker’s nominee company. The broker was
requested to contact the investigator when the balance of the shares were to be
sold. Shortly thereafter the client contacted the investigator and stated that she
had used a false name to avoid tax. However, if the client had sold all of the
shares prior to the investigator commencing his inquiry, then it would have been
too late to trace the real identity of the client.
Let’s just presume that the person we interview has bought shares in
some company and there is no apparent connection between this person and
the company or ofﬁcers of that company. Now, this person does not have to
talk to us but if he or she does and gives us an explanation, say; “One day I
was looking out my ofﬁce window and I saw a ship and I noted the name of
that ship. Several days later I decided to invest in some shares. I look in the
newspaper, and lo and behold, I discover a company is listed with the same
name as the ship I had seen the other day and I decided to go out and buy that
company’s shares.” Outlandish, isn’t it? But that is the story that was given to
one of our investigators when he was investigating an allegation of insider
trading.
In the Commissioner for Corporate Aﬂairs v Green [1978] VR 505, a
prosecution was launched under s. 124 (2) of the Companies Act (1961). Green
was a director of two companies, Endeavour Oil and Gwello. It was alleged that
at an Endeavour company meeting, Green acquired knowledge that Endeavour
was to make a call on it shares. Green with this knowledge, caused Gwello, a
company of which he was a major shareholder, to sell 100 000 of its Endeavour
shares. Consequently, when the prices fell after the ann0uncement of
Endeavour’s call, Gwello had avoided a loss.
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There was no admission by Green that the sale of the shares was decided
on in light of the information gained at the meeting. Green also volunteered
the following information, that Gwello had participated in the purchase of
shares in another company in order to keep that company alive, that this had
placed Gwello in an overdraft situation, that in order to get the company out
of the red and out of paying bank interest it was prudent to seH all shares which
were not producing income and it was decided to sell sufﬁcient Endeavour
shares to cover the situation.
The magistrate ruled the prosecution had to show that the associated _
company had made the sale of shares in the light of information gained at the
directors’ meeting. The prosecution relied on the casual connection which could
be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, i.e., obtain the information and later
the shares were sold, but in the absence of direct evidence the magistrate ruled
that there was no case to answer. This decision was upheld on appeal. This case
dealt with a person making improper use of information. It is interesting to note
the court’s attitude in the absence of any direct admission inculpating the
defendant.
You might think that we may be able to use some of our compulsory
powers to force people to answer out questions, and of course you’re right. For
instance, we could hold a compulsory hearing by virtue of s. 7 of the National
Companies and Securities Commission Act. But even though we can require
witnesses to answer our questions, if they claim the answer might incriminate
them, we can never use that answer in any subsequent prosecution. We may be
able to trace the movement of the shares and the ﬂow of information but that
evidence gleaned cannot be used against the witness. However, the evidence
could be used in a civil proceeding and the Commission, in the public interest,
would be prepared to release the information. This has recently happened in a
matter that the Commission is investigating.
Another situation which can arise is where trading is transacted through
an overseas stock broker. We can go to our local broker to ﬁnd out on whose
behalf he was trading, he informs us that the trading was carried out on behalf
of an overseas stock broker. How do we get that overseas broker to become the
fountainhead of knowledge and tell us who his client was? Let’s say the broker
is coy—we cannot compulsorily require him to tell us the information. That
broker may assist us only in a limited way. We may be in possession of a
number of names which we believe were used by the client in the transaction.
The overseas broker may, in the spirit of co-operation, agree not to show us
their books, but to tell us if they have a record of the names we believe were
used. Now, if we have got the wrong name we are out of luck. Now, you might
say nobody would act like that, but one of our investigators received that
reception from an overseas broker when he enquired who the broker’s client
was in respect of a particular transaction.
Other ways of hiding the identity of a client are eﬂ‘ecting purchases of
shares through overseas companies, and purchasing shares on overseas
exchanges.
As stated earlier, the current concern of insider trading got its
momentum from the Ivan Boesky investigation. However, it is my
understanding that Boesky in fact turned himself in and gave the American
authorities information on the acitvities of other insider traders and thus the
authorities were able then to secure evidence for subsequent prosecutions
making their task somewhat easier.
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I have spoken to some Commission investigators in order to try and
identify novel ways of investigating insider trading. We came up with the idea
of phone taps and listening devices but, as I indicated before, most allegations
of insider trading come to us after the event, so it’s little bit too late for phone
taps or listening devices. One might say, tap phones or place listening devices
before the events—well, we would, if someone would be so kind as to indicate
to us who is going to pass on price sensitive information—it would also be
helpful if you could tell us when and where the information is going to be passed
on. Otherwise, we would have to tap the phone of all the traders, company
officers and their friends all day every day on the off chance that some titbit of
information may clandestinely pass by mouth to car.
In the United Kingdom, insider trading is regulated by the Company
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (The Insider Dealing Act). However, by the
Financial Services Act 1986 the Department of Trade and Industry has very
wide special investigatory powers in regard to offences under the Insider Dealing
Act. The following six paragraphs are extracts from Guide to the Financial
Services Act 1986 by Rider, Chaikin and Abrams.
Under 5. l 77 (l) of the Financial Services Act, if it appears to the Secretary
of State that there are circumstances suggesting that there have been
violations of ss. 1, 2, 4, or 5 of the Insider Dealing Act, he may appoint
one or more inspectors to carry out ‘such investigations as are requisite to
establish whether or not any such contravention has occurred’ and to report
the results to him.
If the inspectors consider that any person is or may be able to give
information concerning any such offence they may require that person to
produce any documents in his possession or control relating to the issuer
of the relevant securities or its securities, to attend before them and to give
them all other assistance which ‘he is reasonably able to give’ in regard to
the investigation. Inspectors may administer oaths and examine any such
person under oath. A statement made by a person in compliance with a
request made under this section can be used in evidence against him.
Under 5. 177 (7) it is expressly provided that information that is subject
to legal professional privilege cannot be demanded by the inspectors.
Furthermore, under s. 177 (8) banks need not disclose information ‘relating
to the affairs of a customer’ unless the inspectors have reasons to believe
that the customer ‘may be able to give information concerning a suspected
contravention’ and unless the Secretary of State is satisﬁed that disclosure
or production of documents is necessary for the purposes of the
investigation.
Section 178 (2) of the Financial Services Act imposes penalties in case of
failure to comply With a request for assistance. or for information by an
inspector. Where there is a refusal to co-operate, the inspectors are
empowered to certify this to the court and 'the court is empowered to
inquire into the matter. If, after hearing evidence from both parties the
court is of the opinion that the refusal to co-operate is unreasonable, it
may punish the person concerned as if he stood guilty of contempt. The
court may also direct that the Secretary of State can exercise his powers
under s. 178. Section 178(2) also provides, most importantly, that the
court may so direct, notwithstanding that the offender is not within the
jurisdiction, if the court is satisfied that he was notified of his right to
appear before the court and of the powers available under this section.
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When the court does direct that the Secretary of State may exercise his
powers under s. 178 (3) in respect of an authorised person, he is
empowered, by service of notice, to cancel any authorisation of this to
carry on investment business after the expiry of a speciﬁed period. He may
also disqualify him from becoming authorised.to carry on investment
business. Restrictions may also be imposed on any authorisation in respect
of investment business during that speciﬁed period to the performance of
contracts entered into before the notice comes into force. The Secretary of
State may also prohibit him from entering into transactions of a speciﬁed
kind, or entering into them except in speciﬁed circumstances, or to a
speciﬁed extent. Furthermore, he may be prohibited from soliciting
business from persons of a speciﬁed kind, or otherwise than in a speciﬁed
manner.
When the court gives a direction under s. 178 (2) (b) in regard to a person
who is unauthorised, the Secretary of State is empowered under s. 178 (5)
to direct that any authorised person who knowingly transacts investment
business of a speciﬁed kind, or in speciﬁed circumstances, or to a speciﬁed
extent, with or on behalf of that unauthorised person shall be treated as
being in breach of the rules of the Financial Services Act or, in the case of
a person who is authorised by virtue of his membership of a recognised
self-regulatory organisation or recognised professional body, the rules of
that authority.
Section 178 (6) of the Financial Services Act provides that a person who
is asked to provide information or furnish a document shall not be taken
to have a reasonable excuse for refusing to co-operate where the suspected
offence relates to dealing by him on the instructions of, or for the account
of, another person simply because at the time of his refusal he did not
know the identity of that person; nor is it a reasonable excuse that he was
subject to the law of another jurisdiction prohibiting him from disclosing
information relating to that transaction without the consent of that other
person if he might have obtained that consent or obtained exemption from
that law.
Thus, it would appear that in respect of insider trading matters the
United Kingdom government has abolished the right to silence in a major leap
forward in the prevention and detection of crime. It just remains to be seen
how these provisions are employed and what the effects will be.
Dr Anisman in his paper on insider trading has draft legislation for
consideration. This proposed legislation does not contain similar provisions to
the U.K Financial Service Act. One wonders in light of the current concern
regarding insider trading1n Australia whether legislation along similar lines to
the legislation in the U.K should be enacted here.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Robert Nicol
The paper that I have prepared which has been circulated provides
information about the methods and responses by regulatory authorities
concerning insider trading. Now I just wish to get away from the paper and
give you a typical example of an insider allegation investigated by the Corporate
Affairs.
It is typical of the allegations that we are being called upon to examine.
Brieﬂy the facts are: In November of one year the Stock Exchange was advised
by the Secretary of company A, let’s say, that negotiations between that
company and company B had reached the stage where shareholders of company
A were asked to consider and approve the acquisition of a number of gold
prospecting licences held by company B. The proposal was to be decided at
company A’s Annual General Meeting to be held in December of that year. A
'copy of the Annual Report was posted to company A’s shareholders and the
Stock Exchange, and this included a report on the gold prospects. The
shareholders subsequently resolved that company A acquire the interests in the
gold licences.
In January the following year the Stock Exchange received a letter from
company A advising that samples had been taken from the gold lease and the
samples were awaiting shipment. In April of that year the Stock Exchange
queried company A concerning ﬂuctuations in the price of its shares from 25
cents in late March to 44 cents after a period of 2 weeks. The price of these
shares over the preceding months was as folloWs: in November, when the Stock
Exchange received the notiﬁcation, the shares traded as low as 6 cents; in
December they traded at 17 cents, and in January, the highest, they traded at
16 cents. The company replied to the Stock Exchange stating they were still
awaiting information concerning the results of the assay being carried out. The
market, however, continued to spiral until company A’s report on the assay
result was received in late April. By then the shares had reached 65 cents. Of
course the report whetted the market’s appetite and the shares continued to
climb to reach a peak well over'a dollar.
The matter was reported to the Corporate Affairs Commission and we
commenced an investigation. The Commission obtained from the Stock
Exchange a print-out of trading. The print-out totalled 520 pages covering a
period of some 16 months, the trading period, which showed the number of
shares traded during that period to be in excess of 18 000 000.
The Commission investigators ﬁrst had to determine who would be the
persons most likely to be in receipt of insider information. It was decided that
those persons would be persons associated with company A and persons
associated with the company carrying out the assay.
An investigation was undertaken at company A and the names of
persons appearing in the Register of Directors, the Secretary, and Managers,
those appearing in the Minute Book, and those appearing in the wages book of
the company were recorded. The same procedure was carried out for the other
two companies. A composite alphabetical list was made and armed with this
the investigators visited all forty-five Stockbrokers and compared this list with
the names appearing on company A’s script ledger. Whilst examining company
A’s script ledger the investigators found names of persons appearing as sellers
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of shares who one would believe had they been in possession of insider
information concerning the impending result they should have appeared as
buyers and this whetted the investigators’ appetite.
Three of these people that the investigators noted as buyers instead of
sellers, had close family ties with the principal, or a principal, of company A.
Another was an employee of the principal, and another lived in close proximity
to him. Inquiries revealed that none of these people had previously purhased
shares on the Stock Market and most of them had used the same stockbroker.
It was discovered that all purchased the shares in early November. The
Commission investigators interviewed these persons and questioned them
concerning their purchases and they were provided with the following
explanations.
1. One said that the principal had said; “If you want to invest some
money invest in company A. It wasn’t a bad investment”, but that
person, the buyer, was not told anything about company A’s share in
particular and there was no other reason given by the principal to buy
the shares other than “it wasn’t a bad investment”.
2. Another said “My girlfriend was buying some and I wanted to be part
of the action. I did not want to be left out. I felt like investing.”
3. Another said “I was owed some money at the time and I was repaid
by way of the shares”.
4. Another declined to be interviewed.
5. Another said “When I ﬁnally got some money I decided to buy some
shares. A friend of mine had been at me for years to buy the shares”.
As well as this, there had been continual rumour about the shares for
about a month before the Annual General Meeting which as I indicated was
held in December, and in the following April the daily press was very active in
focusing their attention on company A. Articles appearing in The Sydney
Morning Herald, the Financial Review, The Australian, the Telegraph, the Age,
the Bulletin. Now, although the principle of company A did not deal in the
shares he had suggested to various people that they should purchase shares, but
there was no clear evidence that he had told them the reason why they should
buy and sell the shares. At the highest it could be said that he had stated that
it was a good investment. From that evidence it would be very difﬁcult to found
a conviction for causing or procuring another person to deal in securities. Also
it would be very hard in those circumstances to sheet home criminal
responsibility to the principal of company A because what information did he
pass on, to quote the terms of s. 128 of the Securities Industry Code ‘that was
not generally available and was likely to materially affected the price of the
shares’? All he had said ‘It’s a good investment’, not that there was a proposed
purchase of gold cross leases, and/or the results of the assay.
Even with the close family relationship between the principal of
company A and some of the persons purchasing the shares these people did not
fall within the deﬁnition of associated persons which is the deﬁnition contained
in the beginning of the Securities Industry Code but associated person is also
used in one of the sub-sections of s. 128.
The reason I have brought this case to your attention is just to point
out some of the difﬁculties that are presented or that we face. You see the
investigation was massive in respect of the fact that there was over 500 pages
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of print-out concerning the trading to be gone through and after that there was
the script ledgers of the Stockbrokers to be gone through. There were forty-ﬁve
Stockbrokers to be interviewed and their records examined and over that
16-month period there were 18 million shares traded. And there were also the
evidentiary problems in respect to ‘materiality’, because that is used in s. 128
and it has never really been deﬁned. What is material?~Is it the accountants’
standard of material? Le. a ﬂuctuation of under 10 per cent is not material; is
it material to the person who has bOught the shares? is it material to the person
who trades in the shares? There is no clear.deﬁnition,of that. Also ‘associated
person’. It did not cover most of the circumstances here, and also we had the
difﬁculty of proving what was price sensitive information. I believe it is some
of these difﬁculties that lead to the Anisman Report, and if you have read the
Anisman Report it seeks to deﬁne ‘insiders’ and then the criminal sanction
penalties virtually says that any person who deals in insider trading is guilty.
That is, to paraphrase, then it shifts the onus on the defendent of proving that
he falls within one of the defences. If you have read the paper there is the recent
Financial Services Act of the United Kingdom. Now that Act came into force
last year and they have introduced a very novel way of dealing with this
particular problem under s. 177 of the UK. Act, where it appears, I believe it
is the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, that the provisions
of the insider trading, or Insider Dealing Act, had someone may be guilty of the
insider trading provisions the Secretary may require a special investigation to
take place, and the special investigator may take evidence on oath and examine
witnesses and that examination of the witnesses may be used in evidence against
them. The only saving provision is that the person may claim legal professional
privilege, or a banker, if he is called upon to give his records over to the special
investigation, may claim the particular records do not cover or do not relate to
the particular transaction under investigation. As I have indicated in my paper
it seems that in England they have, for the ﬁrst time that I know of, got rid of
the right to silence in these particular cases. I am not advocating that we do
that here but it is a very novel aproach, and I think from my reading that that
approach was instigated because of the Boesky scandal with its tentacles crossing
the sea to envelope the Morgan-Grenfell matter.
It is a complex area and we at the Corporate Affairs Commission realise
that to investigate this particular area we must adopt sophisticated and astute
approaches to the problem, and I believe it is desirable now we have more or
closer consultation and cooperation between the public and private sector
regulatory bodies.
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CORPORATE CRIME: A NEW GROWTH INDUSTRY?
Anne Lampe
Financial Reporter
The Sydney Morning Herald
To the layperson reading a sample of sentences handed down in our
courts it would appear that while some crime pays badly or not at all, other
crimes—particularly corporate crime—is lucrative and goes relatively
unpunished.
Take for example the following sample of penalties handed down in
recent months and reported in our newspapers:
0 a man who collected $340.00 in dole payments to which he was not
entitled jailed for six and half years,
0 a man who collected $18,000 in dole payments to which he was not
entitled was put away for two and a half years,
0 a secretary who made 108 false claims for entertainment and meals,
totalling $11,000 received 18 months imprisonment,
0a hungry man who stole food worth $9.24 from a West Ryde
supermarket gets a $300 ﬁne,
0 a security ofﬁcer who stole $600,000 worth of goods is sentenced to 13
and a half years in prison,
0 a deserted mother jailed for 14 days for stealing $1,266 from her
employer to feed and clothe her 20 month daughter. In addition she was
placed on a $500 three year good behaviour bond and ordered to repay
the money stolen in instalments,
and
0 two bottom of harbour tax scheme promoters who sank companies with
$100 million in assets receive 14 and 18 month jail respectively and both
are out in months,
0 a company director who lost $600,000 of small investors’ money receives
a $10 ﬁne and 200 hours of community work,
0 a director of an investment company which folds losing all of the $5
million invested by the public is ﬁned $50,000. The maximum penalty
is $125,000 in ﬁnes plus ﬁve years imprisonment. The director is
appealing against his ‘harsh’ sentence,
0 a director of another investment company which made over $1 million
in management fees in a company unable to meet all its debts, receives
a $200 12 month good behaviour bond,
0 a director who obtains hundreds of thousands of dollars by making false
and misleading statements receives a suspended jail sentence subject to
entering into good behaviour bonds for 3 years.
The courts, it seems, are very reluctant to send to jail corporate
wrongdoers who wear Ermenesilde Zesna or Pierre Cardin suits into the court
and appear to be well groomed and softly spoken, but don’t hesitate to slam
others without these props and who have committed far less serious crimes
netting relative peanuts behind bars. What is more the latter are asked to repay
those from whom they stole, while the former plead the company has collapsed,
is in the hands of receivers and never appear to have any funds to facilitate
repayment to those who have lost their savings. Hardly ever, it seems, are their
private asset holdings investigated with the view of using them to pay out  
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company creditors. Indeed several leveraged currency operators who have
recently had their companies close down and who managed to make sure a lot
of money was placed off-shore were quite relieved to have a receiver appointed,
simply to get the creditors off their backs. No wonder corporate crime—that is
offences committed by individuals hiding behind a low capital corporate veil,
or their agents, against members of the public, creditors, investors or other
taxpayers is growing at an alarming rate.
In recent history, corporate criminals have been most active in bogus
investment schemes, leveraged currency and futures schemes, frauds, insider
trading, money laundering and computer fraud. The pin-striped Porsche-driving
rip-off merchants are having a festival at our expense. Often by the time our
undermanned corporate police catch up with them, the principals have the
funds safely offshore and have often ﬂown out, ﬁrst class, to join their money.
One insurance fraudster is living like a king an Athens, hailed as a
successful local lad made good abroad and a respected member of the Greek
community. The Greek authorities are not interested in investigating him
because he appears not to have committed any offences on Greek soil; he did
not have to, he ripped of millions from Australian investors and policyholders.
Another ﬂy-by-night leveraged currency operator who has operations in two
other countries and who ﬂeeced Australain investors of more than $10 million
over two years is running around in a red Mercedes, with a different gold watch
for every day of the week, quaﬂing Bollinger and enjoying luxurious holidays
at Cannes accompanied by his girlfried, a former director of the same company.
Sitting in on corporate crime cases in court often makes me feel quite
ill. The self satisﬁed smirks can hardly be contained on the faces of the guilty
and their lawyers when a piddling $200 ﬁne or good behaviour bond is handed
out after days of court hearings by a magistrate doing his best to sound tough
and full of admonishing words about how investors deserve the right to be
protected from people such as those in front of him. The sentence does not even
qualify as a slap on the wrist.
Often I have seen the drama unfold over a period of two years,
beginning with spotting advertisements offering outrageous returns, followed by
a ﬂood of poignant calls from investors who fear they have lost their retirement
money, their deposit on a home or merely their life savings in a company being
investigated by the Corporate Affairs Commission (C.A.C.). There follows a
lengthy period of bluff from the company concerned, lies, numerous threats of
litigation, using often the best ﬁrms of lawyers, similar threats against C.A.C.
personnel for allegedly providing us with information, expensive court
proceedings just to get a judge to uphold an application to seize books and
records, or later, to appoint a receiver when the company is insolvent.
The letters of complaint from the company to our editors and to the
C.A.C. are written on top legal letterhead, their counsel selected from the top
Q.C.’s. There seems to be no shortage of funds for such actions. And always at
the end of the day there is no, or very little, money to pay hapless investors.
What there is is often swallowed up in liquidator fees. The funny thing is that
the principal’s life style hardly appears to change. But just getting the principals
into court is an achievement.
Fraud prosecutions—particularly those of a sophisticated sham
investment scheme type involving a massive paper chase, a web of sham
companies and banks and often crooked accountants and solicitors who are only
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too pleased to assist, for large fees, in the setting up of companies in tax havens,
the purchase of real estate in false names and other money washing schemes—
take money, manpower and speed. All three things are often lacking. The Fraud
Squad and Corporate Affairs Commission are operating at less than half the
strength required to fully investigate all the scams in the market.
They are hindered by bureaucratic processes, such as waiting for up to
three weeks to ﬁnd a typist to process urgent summonses to be served and by
outdated and poorly drafted legislation that is drafted to catch embezzlers and
the signatories of false cheques, or whose hands are caught in the till, but which
often cannot cope with a Cardin-suited individual who on his car telephone
instructs his bank to transfer $5 million to an overseas bank account before
lunch. The transaction is electronically carried out and effected in minutes.
It is legislation that is drafted in lofty legal oﬂices with no input from
the investigators who have to put in the legwork and make the evidence stand
up to obtain court orders. Too often these investigators ﬁnd, after weeks, often
months of gruelling work, that the scheme in question just misses out on being
included in a deﬁnition of ‘security’ or ‘futures contract’.
Often the various agencies that should co-operate—the Trade Practices
Commission, the National Companies and Securities Commission, the
Corporate Affairs Commission—don’t co-operate at senior levels because of
petty rivalries. Because of complicated secrecy provisions the operatives cannot
pass on useful information to one another without obtaining written permission
from a supervisor.
Whilst in television crime programmes, the F.B.I. and Fraud Squad
investigators have no shortage of-cars and aircraft at their disposal to enable
them to get off in pursuit of villains, tight budgets in Australia often mean an
investigator has to wait for higher approval to travel interstate. This has, on
occasions, resulted in C.A.C. prosecutors asking courts for more time to gather
evidence, requests that often attract harsh words from the presiding judge about
perceived inefﬁciencies within the Commission. C.A.C. investigators are
confronted with fraudsters with large funds, offering investment packages by
telephone in remote areas of Australia. As a result investigators have had to go
as far aﬁeld as Cairns, Darwin, Broome and the Riverina to gather evidence to
be used in prosecutions and even to have a receiver appointed.
As one investigator points out, the law enforcement ofﬁcers must
contend with expensive counsel who throw every obstacle in the way of
investigators, including the mass dumping of computer tapes containing client
records with solicitors looking on, the best tax advice for moving money
offshore as well as cranky judges who need long narratives on complicated
currency and futures scams before they can understand the ramiﬁcations, but
still insist on the sort of perfect documentary evidence that makes it relatively
easy to put cheque forgers behind bars. They forget that corporate crime has
moved beyond the simple larceny of a cheque or a bank account.
The new wave of scams involve commodity and currency prices that
change every few seconds, buy and sell orders supposedly telexed to remote
locations, where the orders appear to be executed, but in fact, more often than
not, are collected in a bin in a rented ﬂat somewhere in Asia. Try and tell a
judge confronted with copies of these bogus buy and sell orders the transaction
is a scam and unless you have watertight evidence of the dumping or non-
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execution of such orders from another country or a former employee, he often
throws the whole thing out of court, while the villains set off to tell potential
clients of their court victory and mutate their operation to drag in more money.
Then there are the massive time delays in our court system. At best a
simple hearing is obtained 18 months to 2 years after charges are laid. Delaying
tactics by the accused or committal proceedings can extend this time framework
signiﬁcantly. When the case is ﬁnally heard the judge admonishes the plaintiff
for the massive time delays in getting the matter heard, criticises the
disappearance of witnesses and the poor memories of those giving evidence and
being cross examined.
In order to speed up the system the C.A.C. often proceeds summarily
in the lower courts only to ﬁnd itself under pressure to reduce and simplify the
number of charges laid against the accused. In several cases this has resulted in
dozens of charges being reduced to one or two, with the defendant subsequently
found guilty of or pleading guilty to one or two charges and receiving a lenient
sentence, such as a good behaviour bond or ﬁne, because the hearing has
concentrated on what appears to be a simple transgression of corporate law
rather than the pattern of premeditated fraud and cheating on a vast scale that
it is.
In summary I see the main factors contributing to a growth in corporate
crime as—
1. Deregulation of the foreign exchange and commodity trading markets
which has removed Reserve Bank controls and monitoring from areas
previously fairly closely regulated and watched. Prior to deregulation
people who wanted to operate currency scams and move large
amounts of money offshore had to make up a pretty good story for
the Reserve Bank and faced a fair bit of red tape that hindered them.
This is not the case any longer. They can now move money around
at will with no one monitoring them.
2. Undermanning of the policing bodies and lack of resources.
Poorly drafted legislation.
4. The ability, through electronic money transfers and toll free telephone
numbers to attract a lot of money quickly from all over Australia from
centralised ofﬁces with a minimum amount of documentation. It is
not uncommon for scam operators to attract $500,000 to $1 million
per week from investors scattered throughout Australia.
5. The ease with which top accounting and legal brains forget ethics and
can be bought by corporate criminals seeking high powered help which
has enabled these corporate criminals to set up a structure of
companies and trusts abroad for the purpose-of hiding ill-gotten gains.
These top legal brains are able to provide top QC opinions about the
perceived legality of the investment scheme being peddled, to scream
to ministers of big brother and overregulation at every request by
regulators for information about a scheme.
5-
"
How do we tackle this problem?
1. To me it seems that the key requirement is to provide more people
and resources to investigate developing scams. The C.A.C. now has
an intelligence unit whose objective is to suss out scams before they
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attract a lot of public money and so are on the way to minimising
losses from investments in, for instance aqua farming, where some
scam operators saw the beginning of a big future.
2. The C.A.C. should keep a close check on the activities of directors,
principals and company ofﬁcers with previous histories of failed
companies. Such a list should be kept nationally and internationally,
so that each State and other countries are quickly informed of former
activities of convicted or doubtful business people. The recent
initiative of establishing an international register of delinquent
directors to be circulated and updated quarterly among
Commonwealth countries by the Commonwealth Secretariat’s crime
unit, is a welcome step in this direction.
3. Educate the public to be more sceptical and inquiring of high return
investment schemes. Certainly‘ publicise through press release and
ministerial statements suspected scams or schemes under
investigation. Hit the press, radio and television. With respect to the
press, make sure that the mass circulation papers—the Mirror, the
Telegraph, and the Sun—issue information and warnings to their
readers. It is after all, their readers who are often targeted by the get
rich quick operators.
4. Put convicted corporate criminals in jail and include among those
businessmen who plead guilty to frauds and hope that as a result of
that plea they might stay out ofjail. Most make sure money has been
put aside to pay the small ﬁnes usually imposed, but given their
leaning to high spending, high living, and the veneer of respectability
they try to project, nothing better than a two-year jail term, depriving
them of all three things, brings them down to earth and serves as a
warning to others. Corporate crime is pre-meditated and carefully
planned and jail terms act as a deterrent to others in these
circumstances if they accept that they may face the same prospect.
As a journalist I see our role in_the game as heightening the public’s
awareness of the sharp practices as we become aware of them through our
contacts, through advertisements and, from our readers. At considerable risk of
defamation actions we aim to highlight dubious practices as early as possible.
We have a large and loyal group of readers who tend to phone us or
write to us about their fears and experiences in the investment ﬁeld. We also
get anonymous calls from operators disillusioned with what their employers are
doing with investors’ money.
The complaints and other information is passed on to regulatory bodies
which are in a position to take action. These bodies usually mean the C.A.C.,
the T.P.C., the N.C.S.C., or the Insurance Commissioner.
In one classic case a fed up employee, owed money by his employer but
who also took umbrage at his employer’s blatant bucket shop tactics rang me
with information and agreed to make a statement to the C.A.C. That same
afternoon he accompanied fraud squad officers to his employer’s ofﬁce, where
the employer was arrested and charged with conspiracy to cheat and defraud.
A receiver was appointed the very same afternoon.
45
Corporate criminals must be hit in the hip pocket nerve. The authorities
must seize their assets, conﬁscate ill-gotten gains, freeze the funds before they
have a chance to be moved offshore where possible, when the scam is identiﬁed.
As one prosecutor said, keeping the funds at home has a magical effect on
keeping the perpetrators in the same country as where their money is.
We watch for advertisements that appear to offer suspect claims, follow
them up and try to have them removed if possible. I, for one, fought a long
and bitter battle with our revenue besotted advertising department to drop
leveraged currency advertisements last year and eventually succeeded in moving
them out of the business section. However, they were merely moved to the front
of the paper where they were even more visible and to the sports pages, where
they appeared to be better suited.
Finally we can give much unwanted publicity to corporate criminals who
are trying to appear to their friends to be respectable citizens. By writing up
their activities, charges laid against them, reporting on the court proceedings,
highlighting evidence and convictions, we probably inﬂict worse punishment
than any ﬁnes they are asked to pay. Wherever possible we should attempt to
highlight the role of professional advice in the scam.
They say a picture is worth a thousand words. The picture of a guilty
businessman leaving court often says it all. It is visible, it is lousy publicity for
him, and the picture, together with an outline of what he did can serve as a
warning to others that a similar fate may await them. The public disgrace among
people who had hitherto thought him an honest, bright businessman—their
families, friends, business associates—it is something that is diﬂicult to avoid
when article and accompanying photo are splashed all over ‘page 29.’
Unfortunately, too often I hear from liquidators in particular, that so
many people who are affected don’t read the Sydney Morning Herald or the
Australian Financial Review. I would like to see more corporate crime covered
by the popular tabloids which have huge populations of gullible readers, to bring
the activities of some of these corporate criminals to the attention of the very
people they often target. ‘
 CORPORATE CRIME—PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE
Garry D. Dinnie, B. Comm, A.C.A.,
Partner,
Arthur Young & Company
introduction
Many recent surveys suggest that the incidence of corporate fraud is
quite extensive. Often, companies have experienced fraud many times, and the
sums involved are considerable. They range from small-scale yet persistent
frauds perpetrated by individuals exploiting weaknesses in their employers’
management systems, to major scandals involving millions.
Are the victims just unlucky, or is corporate fraud something that could
be prevented? While it will never be possible to prevent all frauds, it is possible
to identify many of the risks and instigate procedures which, at least, provide
deterrents. This, in fact, would help prevent many frauds.
Businesses which suffer frauds often do not possess the right controls or
the controls in place can easily be evaded. Because each business is different,
it may not always be easy to identify the areas of highest risk. However, the
way the business is conducted can, in itself, be an effective deterrent to fraud.
Like most criminals, those who perpetrate frauds will be deterred if the risk of
detection is high.
The Nature of Fraud
Corporate fraud is nothing new—it has existed more or less since the
time when corporations were ﬁrst formed. So, why does it keep re-emerging in
the public arena?
In many ways, fraud is similar to other types of theft. For example—
0 easy targets are often chosen,
0 some individuals are frequent offenders,
0 large crimes are usually carried out by professionals, and
0 no matter how much protection is put in place, it can never be 100%
effective.
However, it does differ from the more traditional theft in some
important respects—
0 It is usually perpetrated by an employee of the company or someone
doing business with it.
0 The opportunities are created by deﬁciencies in the way the company
operates or controls its business.
0 The fraudis often not discovered for a substantial time. When it is, the
offender is often identiﬁed but often not prosecuted, which is the exact
opposite of the situation for many other kinds of theft.
Further, the nature of corporate fraud has undergone significant change
over the past few years. Gone are the days of people dipping into the till or
surreptitiously taking stock out the back door. As the modern corporation has
matured and advanced in step with large scale use of computerisation and other
technological changes, so too has corporate fraud capitalised on emerging
technology to develop increasingly sophisticated techniques.
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Two main developments of the late 1970’s and 1980’s must be
continually borne in mind if we are to adequately understand the current state
of corporate crime and thereby be effectively armed to combat it.
Firstly the emergence of ‘white collar’ crime has seen a change in the
level and background of personnel involved. Mis-appropriation of corporate
assets and fraudulent manipulation of reported results is now often perpetrated
by those involved in higher levels of management. Such people are typically
perceived to be above reproach (at least by their subordinates who are directly
involved in many detection procedures) as well as being positioned above most
of the controls and procedures which exist.
Secondly, these executives usually have the beneﬁt of a high level of
education as well as access to sophisticated tools to aid their endeavours.
Based on the preceding, we can highlight some initial conclusions——
0 Perpetrators, to a large degree, come from within the ranks of higher level
management and they are often either above most control procedures or
will ﬁnd their circumvention fairly easy.
0 They are often highly educated and have access to state of the art tools.
0 We can conclude that fraud may remain and grow to massive proportions
during a considerable length of time.
Types of Fraud
1. Management Fraud
Particularly where senior or sensitive positions are involved, it is
important that detailed and independent references are obtained. A person in
a senior position will often be able to override internal controls or persuade
junior staff that there are pressing reasons why procedures should be ignored
in relation to a particular fraudulent transaction.
2. Purchasing Fraud
Purchasing is particularly vulnerable to fraud. An especially difficult area
is where frauds involve collusion with third parties. Often a buyer is ideally
placed to commit a fraud, especially if in collusion with a dishonest supplier.
Knowing where the risks lie and having effective and efﬁcient internal control
procedures are vital in prevention of such purchasing frauds.
3. Treasury Fraud
. The treasury function in a large organisation always carries a potential
risk, not only from ongoing minor frauds, but also from the one-off transaction
involving very large sums of money. The controls and review of the operations
in the treasury function should be designed to meet these specific risks.
Loss through fraud can arise in many ways and some specific examples
include—
. theft of cheques, both coming into and going out of the organisation and
the use of dummy bank accounts with similar names to the original
payees, .
0 theft of assets;
0 collusion with customers;
 0 short deliveries;
O interference with creditors and debtors ledgers;
0 sale of the company’s assets at deﬂated prices;
0 own account trading by employees;
0 frauds involving commission payments;
0 expenses frauds;
O ﬁctitious overtime or ﬁctitious employees;
0 loss of information, the theft of customer lists, business plans or‘other
business secrets such as computer software; and
0 manipulation of information to improve apparent company performance.
Management clearly has a difﬁcult balance to strike between installing
controls which are so comprehensive that fraud becomes almost impossible and
keeping overheads to a sensible level. The solution of this dilemma is not
straight forward but the problem is soluble.
Is a Sound System Of Internal Control Sufﬁcient?
Historically, systems of internal control have predominantly focused on
detective control procedures. However, frauds may remain undetected for
considerable periods of time, thereby allowing their effects to continually
accumulate. By the time they are discovered, millions of dollars of company
assets may have been diverted and be otherwise unrecoverable.
' Accordingly, given the gravity of these ramiﬁcations, reliance on controls
of a detective nature is no longer necessarily adequate to the task. It is essential
that companies supplement their existing procedures with appropriate
preventative controls. Now, more than ever, the axiom ‘prevention is better than
cure’ becomes a motto to which we should adhere.
What Preventative Controls Should be Employed?
Several areas of improvement in controls are available for a company
to enhance their capacity to prevent corporate crime
Firstly speciﬁc aspects of internal control can be examined and
strengthened in those areas which allow prevention of misappropriation rather
than detection after the fact. Of crucial importance, is the segregation of
custodianship of assets from the systems which generate their transferral. For
many companies, readily marketable assets will involve cash, securities and
inventories. These assets, at a minimum, should be subject to such independent
custodianship.
Secondly supervisory overviews can play a much more important role
in the prevention of corporate crime. Such overviews include greater direct
executive supervision, along with closer monitoring of budget/actual
performance and asset levels.
Instituting such procedures, whilst allowing for an improvement in the
ability of the company to detect corporate crime also provides an effective tool
for dissuading potential criminals where such procedures are communicated to
all levels of staff and are perceived to be effective in the prompt detection of
any abnormalities.
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What can Management do to Fight Fraud?
The main mechanism available to enhance the ability of an organisation
to detect corporate crime is a sound system of internal control. Long established
procedures such as—
. segregation of duties;
0 reconciliation of account balances; and
O examination of transactions in risk sensitive accounts,
must be reconsidered to ensure they are still sufﬁcient to accommodate the
changing environment.
Set an Example
The first and most important thing is the tone from the top. A sloppy
attitude to control does not go unnoticed by other employees, and will
encourage fraud if the risk of detection appears low. Directors and senior
management have a responsibility to ensure good practice. They must set an
example in creating a culture and corporate integrity. Good housekeeping, good
ﬁnancial controls and reliable and prompt management information are all
important aspects of this culture.
Promote a Clear Anti-Fraud Policy
The board of directors should also ensure there is an effective and well
published anti-fraud policy, dealing with——
O a published policy of ‘Corporate Integrity’;
O pubished guidelines on receiving and giving entertainment and gifts and
commissions to third parties;
0 well defined and clear procedures for—
reporting instances of fraud to the board;
investigation of suspected fraud;
dismissal and prosecution of perpetrators;
recovery of losses; and
references for employees dismissed in connection with frauds;
0 deﬁned responsibilities of the board of directors including effective
oversight of the anti-fraud policy and compliance with it;
0 relevant responsibilities for non-executive directors and the audit
committee;
0 relevant responsibilities and reporting lines for internal audit.
Know the Risks and Operate Effective Controls
The controls need to match the requirements of the business. What is
suitable for a stockbroker with a large private client base is different from what
is needed for a manufacturer of industrial machinery. Moreover, the ‘control
environment’ should allow creative action and entrepreneurial behaviour which
lead to growth of the business. The controls should be based on knowing the
risks after a thorough and realistic assessment of the business and the ways in
which fraud could take place. It will usually be necessary to consider.
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Risks to assets—where money can enter or leave the organisation, for
example the loss of existing assets or the payment of ﬁctitious liabilities.
Risks to sensitive information—whether computer based, or other
information on matters such as customer details, contract terms, or bids and
tenders, and
Risks to published information—such as manipulation of company
accounts or insider trading through premature release of ‘price sensitive’
information.
Entry controls—the defences which sh0uld prevent or, at least, deter
white collar criminals entering your organisation, whether as employees,
temporary staff, suppliers, customers or visitors, will usually include—
. checking references of employees thoroughly, not just most recent
employment, particularly where the appointment involved gives access
to sensitive information or to the assets of the business;
0 limiting and controlling the use of temporary staff;
0 taking proper business references on suppliers and customers; and
O ensuring physical security in high risk areas.
Internal controls—the defences which should ensure that the resources
of the business are used properly in pursuit of its objectives, will vary from
simple rechecking of the work of others, through a variety of procedures, to the
review of management information. They will usually include——
0 realistic budgets being subjected to rigorous review;
0 expenditure authorisation;
0 cash management procedures;
0 security of cheque books, payment systems and postage;
o prompt billing and follow-up of non-payments;
0 review of non-routine payments;
0 controls over computing activities;
0 segregation and, where practicable, rotation of duties;
0 ensuring staff take their full allocation of holidays; and
o personnel reviews to highlight individual ﬁnancial risks.
Cost is often given as a reason for removing internal controls such as
these, and management must ensure that the controls are in a reasonable
relationship to the risks involved. However, cost is a poor excuse if those risks
have not been realistically assessed.
Internal Control enforcement—the operation of internal controls is the
responsibility of management. An approach which ensures that management
check employees’ work and in which the checks are unpredictable, but not
infrequent, encourages adherence to laid down procedures.
A well organised internal audit effort is a major weapon in the
discouragement of fraud through tighter internal control. Internal Audit should
have clear objectives and clear reporting arrangements. they need to have
appropriate skills, training and experience, including computer skills. They
should be able to ensure that action is taken to improve efﬁciency and control.
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Follow Up Warning Signs
Management should be on guard whenever there are unanswered
questions in respect of results or the function of internal controls—especially
if it is ‘not convenient’ to make a review. These symptoms should be followed
to their rightful conclusion. Loose ends are often tell tale signs of something
untoward.
Have a Discovery Plan
Dealing with a substantial fraud will inevitably be unpleasant, highly
disruptive of the time and attention of senior management and indeed of the
rest of the business. It will almost always be a ‘one-oﬁ‘ experience and, within
most organisations, experience of dealing with such matters is limited.
When things go wrong, management can act decisively and quickly to
minimise the damage to the business if it has a discovery plan which sets out
a clear guide on what to do.
The discovery plan need not be complex, but should cover—
0 suspension of suspected employees and ensuring that they are not able
to cause further loss or destroy evidence of what has been done;
0 preservation and presentation of evidence of what the fraud was and how
it was committed;
O retrieval of keys, changing locks, computer passwords;
0 removal of bank, computer and security authorisations;
O investigation to determine— ’
how much has been lost?
how was the fraud detected?
what controls were avoided?
why did management not find it earlier?
what other losses are there?
what can be learnt from the episode?
what should be done to prevent reoccurrence?
o reporting—-
to the police;
to the relevant regulatory authorities/trade associations;
0 recovering the loss—
through insurance, where applicable;
by civil action against the offender;
0 public relations, what to say to the press, T.V. and radio, to employees,
customers, suppliers, bankers and shareholders, and who will say it and
deal with queries.
The reporting of fraud is often the most difﬁcult issue, in practical terms,
for an organisation to tackle. The survey which Arthur Young carried out
showed that not a single company interviewed and prosecuted every fraud, not
even every serious fraud.
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There is usually a reluctance to publicise what is an internal, distasteful
affair. The organisation may feel that publicity will show up weaknesses in the
whole management, rather than one unfortunate episode. If management do not
act rigorously, the company is open to future fraud because of damage to the
‘corporate integrity’ policy. Research shows the criminals go on to repeat their
crimes, but usually they get bigger and harder to detect.
Look at the Situation Regularly
Though there are stages in the life of business when it is more exposed
to the risk of fraud than at other times, these are exactly the occasions when
management has its hands full with other problems. For example, during time
of rapid growth; when there has been a merger and management are not quite
sure about the controls in the company they have acquired; or during a period
of decline when morale may be low and management is ﬁghting to save the
business. Another situation of high risk is when remote operations are involved
and management continually relies on financial and management information
from those operations.
By being active rather than reactive in subjecting an organisation to
regular anti-fraud examinations and by investigating thoroughly whenever there
is an unanswered question, an organisation can reduce the risk of being caught
off balance by having to deal with fraud.
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~ PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Stephen Beihl, B. Comm, A.C.A.. C.I.S.A.
Firstly I would like to apologise on behalf of my colleague, Garry Dinnie.
Unfortunately he was called away to business in the US and couldn’t be here
today. Brieﬂy, my background is that I am a Chartered Accountant with Arthur
Young and I have only recently moved to Sydney after a stay of 4V2 years in
Canada. My particular area of interest is computer security.
Many recent surveys have indicated that the incidence of corporate fraud
is widespread and increasing, and this has certainly been my experience. Losses
from corporate fraud range from small amounts to many millions of dollars and
it is the general concensus that reported losses attributed to fraud are only the
tip of a very large iceberg.
What can a corporation do to reduce the risk of fraud? In many
instances businesses suffer fraud because they do not have the right controls in
place, or the established control procedures have not been followed. Certainly
my experience has been that the latter is quite frequently the reason why a fraud
has occurred particularly where reviews and approvals are not carried out or
not performed carefully enough. If a business has in place effective preventive
and detective controls then the risk of fraud is reduced substantially. I would
like to emphasise, however, that the implementation of controls needs to be
balanced against the risk of fraud occurring and the cost to implement these
controls. No system of controls can be 100 per cent effective but can only make
it increasingly difﬁcult for fraud to occur.
Before proceeding further I think it is important to ﬁrstly deﬁne the
characteristics of corporate fraud and the types of fraud committed. Corporate
fraud is similar to traditional theft in that easy targets are chosen, some.
individuals are frequent offenders and larger crimes are often committed by
professionals. More importantly, I think, however, are the differences from
traditional theft. Firstly the fraud is usually committed by an employee or
someone who has dealings with the company. Secondly the opportunities for
fraud are created by the deﬁciencies in the way the company operates or
controls its business. And most importantly corporate fraud is often not
. discovered for some time and when it is the offender is often identiﬁed but not
prosecuted.
The reasons for not prosecuting these offenders are not always clear but
generally seem to be because the company wants to avoid bad publicity and
management is concerned that the resulting publicity will reﬂect poorly on them
as a whole rather than showing the fraud as an isolated incident. Unfortunately
this attitude tends to cause further frauds as offenders are perceived as being
immune from punishment, even when they are caught.
The nature of corporate crime also seems to be changing in recent
decades. For example, the emergence of so-called ‘white collar’ crime has
become more prevalent. Fraud committed by high levels of management is
particularly difﬁcult to prevent because of their position of power within an
organisation. Secondly these executives are better educated than in past years
and have access to state of the art tools and, ﬁnally, the increasing use of
computers to record corporate information, effect control procedures, and
provide the basis for management decision making has meant a change in the
methods by which fraud can be committed. This is mainly due to large volumes
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of transactions processed by computers and the concentration of functions and
capabilities caused by computers. For example, where previously cheques could
only be manipulated by persons with physical access to them, now anyone who
has access to change the computer programmes which print the cheques can
change how the cheques are printed. Control objectives, however, are not
changed with the introduction of computers only the methods by which they
are achieved.
In the paper we have outlined some of the more common methods of
fraud and I will not go into them in detail again. However, I would like to make
two comments: Firstly the treasury function of corporations particularly with
more and more companies becoming players on the short-term money markets
always carries with it a potentially high risk. The risk is expanded because major
frauds can be committed through ‘once off transactions and an example of this
was in The Australian (15 September) where almost £5,000,000 in bonds was
fraudulently transferred to an account in Switzerland, or through the
unauthorised use of corporate funds and an example that I have come across
personally is where large amounts of money are transferred from one
operational entity to another and have been diverted for short periods of time
to an employee’s account to earn substantial amounts of interest. Secondly the
theft of computerised information is becoming more and more an issue. For
example insurance companies are very aware of the competitive disadvantage
they would suffer should their computerised policy master files end up in the
hands of a competitor.
So what can an organisation do to reduce the risk of fraud? Firstly it
needs to be emphasised that different organisations face different types and
degrees of risk and that the procedures adopted will be different for each
organisation. They should reﬂect the results of a realistic risk versus cost
assessment. Secondly organisational controls have in the past typically been
detective in nature. Whilst effective detective controls over a period of time
become to some degree preventative in nature, management also needs to
consider the use of preventative types of controls. This is particularly important
in today’s environment where the volumes of business transactions mean that
undetected fraud can quickly amount to large sums of money.
I will go into some more examples of preventative controls but two that
come readily to mind are security checks on potential new employees, and the
establishment of an appropriate segregation of duties.
So what are the sort of controls that should be considered by
management? Firstly management should institute a corporate culture which
actively discourages fraud. This can best be implemented through the
mechanism of an anti-fraud policy statement. This statement would cover things
such as corporate integrity, guidelines on receiving entertainment, gifts,
commissions, and a plan of action for when a fraud occurs. For example, what
procedures should be followed to suspend an employee, the removal of the rights
attached to that employee such as car keys and passwords into the computer
system, collection of evidence, and to institute loss recovery procedures.
The policy statement should also address the responsibilities of directors,
the audit committee, and the internal audit department. To be effective,
however, it is just as important that management convey to their employees by
their attitude that they treat the issue of fraud seriously and intend to closely
follow the anti-fraud policy.
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There are two main categories of controls which can be instigated and
these are entry controls and internal controls. Entry controls should be
established to deter criminals from entering or dealing with your company. And
examples are thorough reference checking for potential new employees, limiting
and controlling temporary staff, for example by assigning close supervision, by
only assigning temporary rights (for example time limits on passwords to
computerised systems) and ﬁnally the most common is physical security; car
keys, guards and so on. We went through in considerable detail in the paper on
internal controls which can be established (see page 50) and I think I should
only go through some of the more important ones. Possibly the most effective
is the establishment of a realistic budget. The follow up of actual results to
budgeted results can in many cases pick up large scale frauds. To be effective,
however, the budget must ﬁrstly be realistic, and secondly there must be close
and complete follow up of all variances and also instances where variances
would be expected but have not occurred. For example, the sales have decreased
but the cost of sales have remained at budgeted levels.
The implementation of an appropriate segregation of duties is also
important particularly to ensure that the custodianship of assets is separated
from a recording of transactions. Anyone involved in handling cash should not
have the ability to be involved in recording debtors. In computerised systems
this has to go a step further and the appropriate segregation of capabilities as
opposed to normal duties must be established through restrictive access proﬁles.
Expenditure authorisation should be instigated and the most common example
of this is dual cheque signatories for all payments. A cash management
procedure should be instigated. Many organisations perform bank reconciliation
procedures. However, they are not always performed promptly and in some
cases it is not unusual to have the bank accounts unreconciled for up to a year.
Without proper reconciliation it makes it extremely difﬁcult to quickly detect
fraud and bank reconciliations are an effective mechanism to detect many cash
orientated frauds. Finally a policy of regular vacation taking should be enforced.
In many instances fraud has been detected by someone temporarily ﬁlling in
the roles of another employee.
If these controls are established how are they to be enforced? And it is
the enforcement which is the most important issue. Some of the procedures
which are implemented by many of our clients are the enforced establishment
of an internal audit department. Whilst the mandate of an internal audit
department is not to chase frauds it should however ensure control procedures
are adhered to. Secondly management should ensure that frequent and
unpredictable reviews are performed on control procedures. For example, by
visiting warehouses to ensure that goods receiving procedures are enforced and
so on. And ﬁnally any unanswered questions with regards to results or internal
controls should always be promptly and completely followed up.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that management shouldn’t
assume that existing controls are always effective. A change in circumstances
can make existing controls ineffective and increase the risk of fraud. Perhaps
the best example of this is during periods of rapid growth where employees are
called on to do additional work and control procedures are often the ﬁrst to be
dropped. Other periods of risk are mergers and when a company is in decline
and ﬁghting for its survival. Finally, the management of any organisation which
has remote operations should not rely on ﬁnancial reporting packages, but
should also perform regular visits to these sites.
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SOME THOUGHTS 0N INSIDER TRADING AND SELF-REGULATION
Jim Berry, A.C.A., A.S.I.A, A.I.C.S.,
Manager, Regulation & Compliance Australian Stock Exchange (Sydney)
Limited
Insider Trading is essentially a double problem of ethics and disclosure.
Ethics
The media and market watchers are fascinated by the developments of
Insider Trading on Wall Street. Some extracts from Business Week August 10
1987 by Charles Wells are illuminating. ‘The Case Against Drexel: (Drexel,
Burnham, Lambert Inc.) Will the Government come up short?’
0 If Drexel did illegally tinker with these and other deals to put added
pressure on the targets, why would" it have done so? Why would it have
taken a large risk, such as possible S.E.C. (Securities Exchange
Commission) action or marginal gains? One possible answer: Drexel
didn’t do any thing illegal. But if it did, Business Week‘s sources suspect
the answer probably lies in Drexel’s uncommon corporate culture and
in the uncommon personality of Michel Milkin (the head of the
Californian Junk Bond Division).
0 For the organisation with 10 500 employees and $4 billion in revenues,
Drexel is remarkably unstructured, which fundamentally reﬂects and
shapes its culture. Drexel is a loose, decentralized confederation of 500
independent proﬁt centres.
oThere is no organisation chart for the ﬁrm, only a vague chain of
command, no middle management cadre, few executives with formal
titles, hardly any regular meetings, only a trickle of interofﬁce memos.
Groups assemble, disassemble, and reconstitute almost entirely ad hoc.
‘We don’t want to let bureaucracy stiﬂe people’s creativity’, explains
Joseph (the CEO.) ‘We want to let people run their own business to
the maximum extent possible’.
0 Drexel has developed a highly entrepreneurial environment that has
fuelled Drexel’s astonishing success.
OBut some sources question the ﬁrm’s willingness to police its staff
zealously. According to a ﬁrsthand account, one top Drexel executive
recently remarked: ‘There will always be a few bad apples, but rooting
them out would destroy the creative process’.
0 Drexel people came to see themselves as tougher, more willing to take
risks and defy convention. Brains and hustle would triumph over
pedigree and etiquette. The outsider has attracted to Drexel many
nouveau entrepreneurs who needed help bootstrapping their way into the
big leagues. ‘It’s a conscious form of reverse snobbery,’ says a former
Drexel banker.
O ‘Challenging rules and traditions can lead to a lot of creativity,’ says a
Drexel former staffer, ‘but it can also lead you to push the boundaries
of your personal standards. It can lead to an attitude where it’s OK. to
bend the rules a little to close a deal.’ Adds one insider: ‘The Drexel game
is played at the edge.’
0 ‘Milkin (head of the California Junk Bond Division) was putting so much
money in everyone’s pockets that nobody wanted to question him,’
claims a former Drexel man.
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0 ‘With Milkin, it’s different. Michael wants to win the game. Michael
wants to have it all. Michael wants to do every piece of business and
every deal and make every dollar.’ Milkin has cultivated close friendships
with many of Drexel’s top clients, and several of them have said their
primary loyalty is to Milkin, not the ﬁrm.
0 ‘It’s a mentality where you want to win very much, and you want to
make sure that you win, so you do everything you can do.’
The article highlights the pressures to vary codes of conduct and ethical
standards. Drexel’s culture is apparently one reason for the current situation
where they are under investigation by the SEC.
It is commonly believed that the publicity and the SEC. investigation
has had some detrimental effect on Drexel’s business. Later in that same article
it is reported that Drexel’s market share of US. public corporate underwritings
for the ﬁrst half of 1987, according to I.D.D. Information Services Inc., dropped
to 7.3 per cent from 12.5 per cent for the ﬁrst half of 1986. Its share of junk-
bond deals fell from 51.9 per cent to 32.3 per cent. The company’s previous
growth has come to a halt. Maybe this is an example of the market pricing a
ﬁrm’s ethical standards.
Indeed, culture appears to have a price.
Disclosure Price Sensitivity
I once thought that it was reasonably simple to establish whether
information was price sensitive. Obviously price sensitivity is only one of the
elements to be proven for insider trading, however, I have only dwelt on this
aspect because of the difﬁculties I perceive in prosecuting in this area.
Some ﬁndings on market movements prior to announcements have been
available for some time:
0 Brown, Finn & Hancock on Dividends and Proﬁts found in the period
1963-1973 that:
‘prior movements anticipate the proﬁt or dividend announcement,
substantial reactions to the tie, and little or no reaciton thereafter.’
'0 Ball, Brown & Finn on Share Capitilisation Changes found in the period
1960—1969 that:
‘Abnormal returns were earned, on average over the year prior to and
at the time of bonus issues, rights issues and price splits,’ and ‘in each
case, much of the abnormal return occurs in the month of
announcement’.
Ball concluded that:
A large body of studies, conducted overseas and in Australia, has produced
evidence of a remarkable degree of consistency. The ‘classical’ pattern is
one of prices moving in advance of and at the time of particular
information announcements, with little or no movements after the
announcements.
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Similar ﬁndings were contained in another Business Week article from
the 24 August. In ‘Insider Trading: Business as Usual’ we ﬁnd the following:
0 A study of pre-bid trading in takeover stocks conducted for Business
Week by Data Resources, using data from Mergers & Acquisitions
magazine’s data base, shows that in the year since 1 July, 1986, 70 per
cent of the 130 acquisition targets showed the same pattern. That may
not seem like a large number, but in fact, it’s extraordinary. What are
the odds against 70 per cent of any 130 stocks beating the market?
According to Data Resources, they are astronomical: 392 000 to 1.
0 It seems that once the shock of the Boesky Investigation wore off, the
scandal had no lasting impact on the number of pre-offering (takeover)
stock-price runups (price increases).
0 If runups like these are a rough barometer of buying and selling on the
basis of insider tips, the implications are grave for the govemment’s
crusade against insider trading.
0 The evidence strongly indicates that pre-deal buying on the basis of
unfairly obtained information won’t be stiﬂed.
0 Sometimes a stock climbs because a potential acquirer is accumulating
the shares. Strong earnings reports also help fuel a price rise. And media
speculation and previous bids often mark a stock as a likely target.
0 A February 1987 S.E.C. study of pre-merger activity in stock prices,
while pointing to the multiplicity of public sources that might drive up
target-company stocks, noted that such “street talk” . . . could ultimately
be fed by illegal disclosures’.
O The bull market, of course, has provided the momentum that rumours
like these need to grow.
I would not have thought such evidence would be available so soon after
the wide publicity the Boesky affair received. But is there a reasonable
explanation for pre-announcement price movements? In a perfect world all
information would be disclosed. There would be no price sensitive information
to trade on. Analysts are now accepted as having sophisticated techniques based
upon ﬁnancial modelling programmes. Analysts are encouraged by the market
to predict proﬁt outcomes or, in the case of resource companies, the extent of
reserves. After company visits by analysts the research results are checked with
the company. Obviously the analysts obtain, by this process, a high degree of
credibility and it is an effective process to ensure the value of the company is
correctly portrayed to clients of the analyst. Release of the analyst’s report may
affect the price and the resultant trading should correct the market price.
Is such a process subject to abuse? Won’t the unscrupulous overvalue
their assets or prospective proﬁts to artiﬁcially inﬂate their company’s value?
Maybe in the short term the company might be overvalued but once the
promoter is seen to provide unreliable information, it will soon be discounted.
Past performance indicates analysts’ predictions on proﬁtability are
remarkably accurate. If the predictions are accurate then proﬁt announcements
are probably not price sensitive by themselves. The analyst’s past projections
have eliminated the ‘price sensitivity’. Similarly, capital raising in many cases
are able to be predicted by analysts. One might not be privy to the terms of an
impending issue but it is possible to predict the company’s needs. Analysts’
ﬁnancial modelling programmes might even come up with the same formulae
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as the underwriters. Is that price sensitive information? No, the information
has been gleaned other than from the inside, and therefore it is not something
in which the regulators would take an interest.
If one analyst can establish a company is undervalued can’t he predict
that it will be taken over? If there is turnover in the stock, can’t a dealer put
two and two together and come up with ‘takeover’? It follows that the odds of
these 70 per cent- of companies (the ones mentioned in the second Business
Week article) doing better than the market are greatly reduced. Again the
information, in such a situation, may not have come from insiders.
It is obviously a very complex area.
In conclusion, as a regulator, how does one prove information is price
sensitive?
Self Regulation
I would like to ﬁnish with a few comments on self-regulation.
Self regulation normally involves:
0 the licencing process;
0 education and training of licencees;
O establishing business conduct rules and a code of ethics;
0 monitoring compliance with ﬁnancial conditions;
0 administering discipline; and
O maintaining reporting requirements;
The regulatory authority in administering Self Regulatory Organisations
(S.R.O.’s) should have the power to enter and inspect any S.R.O.’s operations,
to suspend S.R.O.’s, to limit activities, functions or operations, to suspend or
revoke their registration or to exercise a variety of speciﬁed powers over the
directors, ofﬁcers and employees of the S.R.O.
With such wide powers, the regulatory authorities must ensure they do
not undermine the S.R.O.’s autonomy and its authority over its members.
Undermining could easily take place if the S.R.O. took disciplinary action
against those for whom it is responsible, and if after disciplinary action by the
S.R.O., the regulatory authority then took further disciplinary action in the
matter. The defendant would be subject to double jeopardy and the authority
of the S.R.O. undermined.
Furthermore, communication between the S.R.O. and the regulatory
authority must, to the greatest possible extent, be open and frank. Presently in
Australia the regulatory authority is limited in what it can tell an S.R.O. about
the S.R.O.’s own members. Laws of defamation should not hinder
communication between the regulatory authority and its S.R.O.’s. I believe that
will change under the new licencing procedures currently being prepared by the
N.C.S.C. However, if, there is not open communication between the regulatory
authority and its S.R.O.’s then problems will inevitably occur.
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An effective S.R.O. should encourage each of its members to install their
own compliance functions, thereby sub-delegating compliance. That position is
common in the UK. and USA. but as yet not widespread in Australia. The
installation of a compliance team should be considered by all professional
organisations to monitor their ethical conduct. A small price to pay to maintain
one’s reputation.
Should the authorities determine that a Self Regulatory Organisation is
not performing its tasks efficiently and conscientiously, and monitoring the
activities of its members, in line with the criteria for its establishment, then,
and only then, should the authorities have recourse to the Self Regulatory
Organisation in the ﬁrst instance and later to members of the Self Regulatory '
Organisation.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
Jim Berry
My position is Manager of Regulation and Compliance at the Australian
Stock Exchange, Sydney, formerly the Sydney Stock Exchange. As such my
responsibilities are both the ﬁnancial reporting requirements of member
organisations, i.e., brokers, and increasingly ethical matters.
Since Patrick Partners demise in 1975 the Exchange has concentrated
on accounting matters to ensure that we avoid such a situation again but in the
sort of environment that we are in now we are increasingly looking at ethical
matters.
Now I have adopted a bit of a scattergun approach to raise a few issues.
I would just like to repeat an article from February this year from ﬁnancial
papers in the share market column. It says Broker X, which is partly owned by
Company Y and an underwriter to the rights issue, was ‘selling out of company
Y as fast as it could before the issue was announced one broker said’. (This was
immediately before the announcement of rights issue.) The stock opened at
$5.24, and was ‘on the back foot pretty well all the day, closing 28 cents down
at $4.98’. Now I would think there is good reason for a broker to be very wary
of his reputation, if he does not, he leaves himself open to serious charges of
market manipulation, insider trading, etc. It is something, however, I believe
that the securities industry as such is not very well informed about.
To my mind insider trading is essentially a double problem. One is
disclosure, and the other one is ethics. In the ethical problem I have in my
commentary provided a page and a half of extracts from a recent US. Business
Week article on ‘The Case Against Drexel: Will the Government Come Up
Short’ this argues whether the US. S.E.C. will be successful in their investigation
of Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated and the article talks about the type
of organisation that Drexel is. (See pages 56 and 57)
I realise this is just a magazine article and it is hearsay, etc., but it is
talking about one of the top US ﬁrms dealing in securities and what I
concluded from the article is that the pressures to vary codes of conduct and
ethical standards are great, and in this sort of bull market the pressures are
much greater.
It is commonly believed that the publicity from the Boesky and the
Drexel investigation has stopped the rapid increase in the growth of Drexel,
and I would like to hazard a comment that maybe this is a cost of running the
type of organisation that Drexel did. If you are going to play close to the line,
then you have to expect the market to assess you.
Later in my comments I talk about the self regulatory function and I
believe what should be happening is that each ﬁrm- should have its own
compliance section to address the types of problems that we have raised (See
pages 59 and 60)
The next matter I would just brieﬂy like to talk about is disclosure and
price sensitivity. Following on from what Bob Nicol said I think it is extremely
difﬁcult to establish price sensitivity. Back in the 605 Professor Ball and the
Australian Graduate School of Management basically stated that ‘prior
movements anticipate the proﬁt or dividend announcement and substantial
reactions at the time and little or no reaction thereafter’ (see page 57). In other
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words, for B.H.P. to come out with a proﬁt announcement of X dollars, because
people have been visiting the company doing research reports, that company’s
announcement of their proﬁt is probably not price sensitive. Now, that is
probably a revelation to some solicitors.
Taking that a step further, subsequent to the Boesky affair there is a
recent report in Business Week on the 24 August and that shows that in 70%
of the 130 acquisitions since insider trading ﬁrst came to light, the market in
those securities has risen substantially. An analyst has come out and said that
the odds against 70% of those stocks moving is 392,000 to 1. The article
concludes that once the shock of the Boesky investigation wore off the scandal
had no lasting impact on the number of takeover price increases.
Now, I ﬁnd this fascinating. If we are led to believe that publicity will
dampen and make everybody more subdued in the way they invest, then one
would have thought that these sorts of price movements should not have
happened subsequent to the Boesky affair. So I have brieﬂy set out what I think
could be the reason. If you are the management of a company you would like
to see your shares correctly priced, what you do is provide openings for analysts
to come along to review your operations. You provide enough information so
that they can come up with a reasonable estimate of proﬁtability. So basically
it is the standard of information that is being provided to analysts that is, in
effect, making a lot of so called non-public information non-price sensitive.
This was not always the case. In the ’605 the attitude was that if you
were a company manager you wanted to keep as much fat on the bone.
Therefore you didn’t revalue your assets. So we have come a long way since
then. But in the current environment there are people with great ﬁnancial
modelling products and there is a great deal of information out there in the
market place that is non-conﬁdential, and from that Mr Brierly, Mr Holmes
a’Court are arriving at the value of companies’ assets all the time. That is what
their job is. so they are getting in there buying up undervalued assets and then
letting the market judge the situation.
If analyst X can come up with the same conclusion as Mr Brierly or Mr
Holmes a’Court as to a company’s worth or the analyst or corporate ﬁnance
department of a broker sees activity then you don’t have to be too clever to go
along and recommend to a fund manager to start buying that stock. Now, that
to me is a very simplistic way of explaining why the Wall Street ﬁgures showed
that 70 per cent of 130 offerings had pre-price risements rising.
On to the problem of publicity. I was on a recent committee for the
Securities Institute to put a paper to the N.C.S.C. on the Anisman suggestions
on insider trading. That is contained in J.A.S.S.A., the recent issue of the
Securities Institute, and we suggested that publicity was very necessary. This is
going on from Anne Lampe’s point that really publicity ensures that practices
are exposed to public debate. Therefore, we are encouraged that the N.C.S.C.
is proceeding with some insider trading cases, because what I think has been
lacking is the practitioners in the market have not been discussing the matter
at both theoretical and practical levels. Therefore, I think that the public debate
that will ensue from those cases will be invaluable. Whether or not they are
successful is probably irrelevant.
From a professional’s point of view the ultimate penalty is to be charged
with professional misconduct. It must effectively ruin that professional’s
reputation.
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Finally, I have a few thoughts about self regulation, and it is something
that you might think is a little bit out of context in this arena. Self regulation
is basically the delegation by the regulatory authority to a body of people or
the Board of let us say the Stock Exchange to administer its own members’
affairs. The Green Paper on Licensing by the N.C.S.C. suggests that self
regulation be extended past the Exchanges to a group of'other people including
Unit Trust Association, the Merchant Bankers’ Association, etc., and the
N.C.S.C. is drafting legislation in that regard now.
So it will be something that will in a year or so be really a topical matter
and I thought I would just touch upon it because a self regulator does have .
disciplinary responsibilities.
The regulatory authority should have the power to enter and inspect any
S.R.O.’s operations, to suspend S.R.O.’s, to limit activities, functions or
operations, to suspend or revoke their registration, or to exercise a variety of
speciﬁed powers over the directors, ofﬁcers, and employees of S.R.O.’s. I believe
this is necessary so that the delegation process can be properly administered
(see page 59).
S.R.O.’s have the advantage of less constraint regarding resources and I
can say from my position in the Stock Exchange that basically that if we want
some resource we get it. I would suggest that is one reason, maybe the major
reason, that the governments have, in both Australia and the U.K., really
pumped for S.R.O.’s. With that power over the S.R.O.’s I think that it is
imperative that the regulatory authority must ensure that they do not undermine
the S.R.O.’s autonomy and its authority over its members. Undermining could
easily take place if the S.R.O. took disciplinary action against those for whom
it is responsible, and if after that disciplinary action by the S.R.O. the regulatory
authority then took further disciplinary action in the matter, the defendant
would be subject to double jeopardy and the authority of the S.R.O. would be
undermined. I think that is a real problem.
Furthermore communication between the S.R.O. and the regulatory
authority must be open and frank. Presently there are laws of defamation and
I believe that is being addressed in the next amendments to the Securities
Industry Code.
Getting back to the problem we had with the culture of Drexel, an
effective self regulatory organisation should encourage each of its members to
instal their own compliance functions thereby sub-delegating compliance. That
position is common in the UK. and the US. but is not widespread in Australia.
I would suggest that if we had a Boesky affair in Australia then we might have
a few more brokers, merchant banks and banks with their own compliance
sections. The installation of the compliance team should be considered by all
professional organisations to monitor their ethical conduct. It seems a small
price to pay to maintain one’s reputation.
The N.C.S.C., should be congratulated on commencing action on three
insider trading cases that it’s alluded to, but really the authorities have to
recognize that if the self regulatory organisation is not performing its tasks
efﬁciently and conscientiously and not monitoring the activity of its members
in line with the criteria for its establishment then, and only then, should the
authorities have recourse to the self regulatory organisation in the ﬁrst instance,
and later to the members of the self regulatory organisation. This is getting back
‘ to my problem of double jeopardy.
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And, ﬁnally, I- would just like to touch on one of the problems in the
previous speaker’s paper, being ﬁrms in general not willing to come forward to
disclose defalcations by their employees. Now, in the examples that I have seen
it involves the member organisation in a great deal of additional administration
that will in many cases last for several years. It is an easy answer to say: “Look,
we will take the easy way out and therefore we will just sweep the matter under
the carpet, we will dispose of the matter and we will be ﬁnished with the
problem”. The problem, in the case of something like the Stock Exchange where
there is a merry-go-round of people moving from one organisation to another,
is that the bad apples never get rooted out. So the Exchange in Sydney has
adopted the policy of requiring brokers to inform the Exchange where somebody
has breached a trading rule or something that requires ethical consideration.
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BUCKETSHOP—BUSTERS
Michael G. Hains
Assistant Counsel—Compliance
Sydney Futures Exchange
Introduction
This paper will discuss one specialised area of fraudulent‘ practices in
the ‘futures’ industry in Australia. The topic needs to be discussed in context
and accordingly the reader should understand that by and large the fraudulent
practices discussed in this paper are conﬁned to non-members of the Sydney
Futures Exchange (the Exchange). The Exchange is the ninth largest futures
exchange in the world and is the biggest futures exchange in the Asia-Paciﬁc
Region. As an indication of the Exchanges increasing role as an international
exchange the Exchange during, this year has been invited to make presentations
and to participate as panelists at international seminars on futures in Chicago,
Tokyo, London and Zurich, together with representatives from the major
exchanges in the northern hemisphere, including the Chicago Board of Trade,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and LIFFE.2
The Exchange and the futures industry in Australia has a good
reputation and it is unfortunate that certain companies and individuals who
are not part of the main stream of the futures industry, have engaged in
fraudulent practices.
In Australia fraud in the area of futures can be divided into two broad
categories. First those individuals or companies who offer so-called leverage
currency contracts to members of the public.3 Secondly those individuals or
companies who purport to be futures brokers, but instead of executing the
orders on a recognised futures exchange, bucket them.4 These bucket-shops trade
such exotic commodities as Tokyo Red Beans and Maebashi Dry Cocoons.
The leverage currency dealers do not, as a general rule, represent that
they trade on a recognised futures exchange. It was, however, normal practice
for them to take a principal position against their clients. This meant that a
loss to the‘client was an equivalent proﬁt to the company, and conversely, a
proﬁt to the client was an equivalent loss to the company. Therefore, it is in
the company’s interest to let losses mount and close out 5 the client’s contracts
while in a loss situation. Proﬁtable contracts are ‘rolled-over’ 5 into new
contracts with the hope that a loss would result. Excessive commissions are also
a characteristic of these operations. These companies operations are analgous
to a bookmaking operation where the clients have a bet with the ‘company‘ on
the movement of various currencies or other commodities.
The term ‘fraud’ as used in this paper implies abusive conduct as opposed to fraud in the
narrow criminal sense.
SFE News/ink, Issue 2 August 1987 at l.
The term ‘Ieverage currency contract’ is used in a generic sense here, and the contracts have
been known by a variety of other names.
to
u
a Bucketing is discussed later in the paper.
5 ‘Closing out’ means entering into an equal and opposite contract. The difference in price
between the contracts will determine whether a proﬁt or loss has been made.
6 Proﬁts are realised by closing out the client’s position. The proﬁts are then used to re-establish
a position in the market, hence the client’s position is ‘rolled-over’.
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The demise of the leverage currency dealers was brought about by
decisive action taken by the N.S.W. Corporate Affairs Commission (C.A.C.)
under the Futures Industry (N.S. W.) Code, and the Companies (N.S. W.) Code.
The second major group are those companies or individuals who purport
to execute orders on recognised futures exchanges, but in fact the orders are
never placed but rather they are bucketed (of course, not all companies who
trade Japanese markets bucket). It is this type of operation which this paper
will discuss.
What is bucketing?
Bucketing has been described as the failure to execute an order on a
recognised futures exchange when required to do 50.7 Bucketing involves a
broker not complying with the instructions of his client to execute a contract
on a recognised futures exchange.8 Put crudely, the orders are normally telexed
offshore to create the illusion that they are being executed, when in fact they
are not.
Bucketing is prohibited by s. 128 of the Futures Industry Code (the
Code), which provides—
‘A futures broker shall not deal in futures contracts on behalf of another
person unless the dealing is effected—
(a) on a futures market of a futures exchange or recognised futures
exchange; ,
(b) on an exempt futures market; or
(c) as permitted by the business rules of a relevant organisation of which
the broker is a member.
Penalty: $10,000 or imprisonment for 2 years, or both.
The effect of s. 128 is to compel all trades to be executed on a futures
market, unless otherwise permitted by the business rules of an exchange. Section
128 is the principal anti-bucketing provision of the Code. Section 45 of the
Code will also be relevant as it prohibits the establishment, maintenance or
provision of a futures market that is neither a futures market of a futures
exchange nor an exempt futures market. This section prohibits a company
taking a principal position against a client. When a company does take a
principal position against a client in an off-exchange situation the opportunity
for abuse is obvious.
7 D. Chaiken, ‘Commodity Investment Fraud’ (1985) 6 Company Lawyer 261 at 266.
3 See M. G. Hains ‘Duties and Obligations of a Futures Broker to his Client’ (1987) 3 Aust. Bar
Rev. 122 at 125 and 129. See also Drexel Burnham Lambert International NV v. Nasr [1986]
l FTLR l at 12; Options Investments (Aust) Pty Limited v. Martin [1981] VR 138 at 142;
Commodities Exchange Act 1974 s. 46 (D): and Re Seigel Trading Company Inc [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm Fut L Rep (CCH) II 20, 452 at 21,827 (1977).
67
Why Australia?
A number of factors have assisted the growth of this type of activity in
Australia. The factors include—
0 the deregulation of the Australian ﬁnancial sector, for example, the lifting
of exchange rate controls which allowed brokers to more freely deal on
foreign exchanges. The deregulation of the ﬁnancial sector and its
resulting sophistication has encouraged the growth of Sydney asa major
ﬁnancial city in the Paciﬁc Basin, in particular we have seen a growth
in the use of futures contracts;
0 a growing public awareness of futures;
O the greed and gullibility of the Australian investing public;
0 the wealth of Australia;
Othe absence of national legislation to regulate the futures market in
Australia prior to 1 July 1986.9
A very important factor was that in the early 1980’s when the Australian
futures market was experiencing tremendous growth this type of fraud was
prevalent in Asia. The authorities took steps to curtail the abusive activities of
certain companies. Unfortunately, the authorities in Asia laid no charges against
the people involved nor did they advise the relevant Australia regulatory
authorities which permitted these companies to move into Australia unhindered.
Characteristics of a Bucket-Shop
Generalisations should, as a rule, be avoided. However, there are certain
characteristics which suggest a bucket-shop operation. Not all bucket-shops will
have all characteristics. Similarly, the presence of some of these characteristics
does not necessarily mean there is a bucket-shop.
Some of the characteristics are listed below—
. palatial ofﬁces where no expense is spared. It is not uncommon to ﬁnd
fancy wall charts plotting the movement of Maebashi Dry Cocoon or
some other exotic commodity in the reception area (the charts are usually
out of date), and a jar of Tokyo Red Beans may be visible in the plush
reception; .
0 employees are literally taken off the street, their previous experience or
personal qualities are of little signiﬁcance. What little training there is,
emphasizes salesmanship rather than providing competent .advice to
clients;
The client advisors do not know a great deal more about futures than
the people they are cold-calling. Staﬁ‘ turnover is generally high;
0 client advisors are paid a small retainer and their income is principally
derived from commissions. It is common for commissions to be based
on the number of trades executed per month. The higher the number of
trades per month, the higher the commission per contract traded. The
commissions are generally very high;
0 client advisors are set ‘quotas’ to attain each month and considerable
pressure is brought to bear for those quotas to be achieved;
9 The only legislation prior to l July 1987 was the Futures Market Act 1979 (N.S.W.)
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O trades are predominantly ‘executed’ on overseas markets, in particular,
the Japanese markets. One reason why the Japanese markets are chosen
is because prices on Japanese markets do not ﬂuctuate minute by minute,
but are set for all contracts traded in a particular session. Hence the
trader is able to advise clients that contracts have all been traded at the
one session price, whereas in reality they have not. Additionally, the
client is less likely to have access to, or be familiar with, market
information on Japanese markets nor will they be familiar with the
commodities traded. Quite often there will be one or two companies
through whom the orders will pass before they ‘reach’ the Japanese ﬂoor
member. Invariably, the companies will be in different countries and the
‘audit trail’ supporting the executing of orders will be lost. Bucket-shops
are unable to substantiate that orders are being executed on a recognised
futures exchange beyond providing telexes. One purpose which the
intermediate companies serve is to act. as a barrier against investigation,
for example, when asked who the orders are being passed onto, they will
respond that it is a trade secret. ‘
Bucket-shops will not normally deal with ﬂoor members of Japanese
markets directly because it would be more difﬁcult to bucket;
0 it is standard broking practice to place orders by phone. Conﬁrmation
of the orders will generally be made by telex or facsimile at the end of
each day. Daily trading advices are issued together with monthly
statements at the end of each month. However, bucket-shops will
generally place the orders by telex and receive conﬁrmations by telex.
There is no evidence that the orders are executed beyond telexes;
0 clients sign a discretionary account or ‘authorisation letter’ conferring
upon the company a right to trade on behalf of the client at the
company’s absolute discretion. Clients would be safer if they gave the
company a blank cheque! The Client Agreement Forms used normally
contain extensive exclusion clauses, as well as an array of outrageous
clauses, such as clauses which:
(a) permit bucketing, although the effect of the clause would not be
understood by the client. The clauses can on occasion be very subtle
and although the writer has had considerable experience in vetting
Client Agreement Forms, occasionally he has found these clauses can
go unnoticed;
(b) provide that the company’s authority to trade can only be withdrawn
in writing. This permits the company to continue trading after being
orally advised to cease trading. The client has forgotten the contents
of the ‘ﬁne print’ which says authority can only be withdrawn in
writing and the client will not be reminded of this when they orally
withdraw authority;
(c) provide that an entry into the company’s general ledger is conclusive
evidence that orders have been placed on a recognised futures
exchange;
0 clients accounts are churned. That is, trades are placed for the purpose
of generating commissions for the company rather than in the interests
of the client.‘° The company will inform a client that they are trading
'0 See generally “Commodity Litigation” New York Law Journal May 23 1985; Commodities Law
Letter April 1984 and March and April 1985; Chaiken at 266.
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one contract for the client, when in fact the contract size is double or
even quadruple the actual size of the contract traded on the Japanese
markets. The use of double and quadruple contract sizes facilitates
churning (although it is not an element of churning in its own right).
Even when the accounts are not discretionary, relatively unsophisticated
clients are targetted. Invariably the client will follow the advice of the
company and its representative; '
o nearly all of a client’s money is committed to the market straight away.
No money is left in reserve to pay for margin calls. The writer has seen
cases where hundreds of positions were opened on the ﬁrst day of
trading;
0 bucket-shops typically obtain clients by cold-calling through the yellow
pages or other forms of client lists. The client advisors emphasize the
proﬁts that canibe made and rarely dwell on the risks involved;
0 the directors of the company or senior management are the only ones
who know what is going on and the employees are generally not told a
great deal;
If a client complains about losing money, the company will say that 85
per cent of people who trade futures lose money. A convenient excuse for use
by these companies. What they fail to tell the clients is that 99 per cent of their
clients lost money.
Why were they allowed to ﬂourish for so long?
There is no single factor which permitted the activities to exist for so
long, but rather a combination of a number of different factors—
. the absence of national legislation permitted these companies to exist in
a ‘void’, that is, they could trade without being a member of the
Exchange or being licenced by a regulatory body;
0 clients did not fully understand futures, never mind the elaborate ploys
being used. This is particularly important because this resulted in few,
if any, complaints being made to the C.A.C. If a complaint was made to
the Exchange no action could be taken because they were invariably not
members of the Exchange and hence the Exchange had no jurisdiction
to investigate the complaint. Additionally clients were reluctant to
complain to anybody because they are embarrassed;
. 0 even if a complaint was made to Corporate Affairs, the Commission
lacked the expertise to investigate the elabOrate ploys being used. There
is little doubt that the C.A.C. is today much better equipped to combat
this type of fraud. Both the C.A.C. and the Exchange initially lacked
knowledge about the Japanese markets and this hindered any proper
investigation;
0 the failure to recognise the extent of the fraud in the early stages. It is
only over the last 6 to 12 months that the extent of the fraud has become
known;
0 the evidentiary problems of proving fraud. For example, it is difficult to
prove that the absence of an audit trail means that the orders were not
placed. Additionally, most of the evidence is off-shore.
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Why use Foreign Exchanges?
The reasons for using a foreign exchange are simple and include—
. an investor is unlikely to be familiar with such markets;
0 language barriers;
O the problem of establishing an audit trail through a number of overseas
jurisdictions;
O evidence is normally overseas and it is costly and resource intensive to
obtain;
0 diﬂiculty is obtaining the assistance of overseas regulatory authorities;
0 the inability to check a broker’s trades because there is no ofﬁcial prices
published daily;
0 trading in obscure commodities necessitates more dependence on brokers
for advice and other matters such as price, market volatility, market
trends and cash market conditions.
Problems faced by Regulators
The problems faced include—i
'0 lack of resources and man power to investigate all the companies
suspected of such behaviour;
0 lack of complaints by people who have been ripped off. These people
fail to realise that the information they have can give great insight into
the company’s operations when they speak to the correct people;
0 difﬁculties in checking foreign qualiﬁcations. On occasions, the
companies who provide the references are of questionable integrity
themselves;
0 you can not refuse membership of an Exchange or the issuing a licence
on a suspicion. Section 53 of the Code gives an applicant for membership
a statutory right of appeal if they are rejected from membership;
0 the best evidence is usually obtained too late for any effective action to
be taken; -
O the evidentiary problems already discussed.
Conclusion
The quickest and most efﬁcient way of closing down these operations is
to give extensive coverage in the popular press to their fraudulent activities.
Once their cash-ﬂow is curtailed the companies quickly close up. It is also
important for regulatory bodies to exert pressure on these companies by court
action and by other means.
The current crack-down on these fraudulent activities will in the long
term be beneﬁcial.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
Michael Hains
By way of background I am a practising Solicitor employed by the
Exchange and I have been specialised into compliance area at the Sydney
Futures Exchange. It came more by chance than anything else that there has
been a lot of allegations of fraud in the area of futures in the last six to twelve
months.
Before I speak to my paper I would like to comment on Anne Lampe’s .
paper. I identify very much with what she has said. Particularly, I am familiar
with not only companies which purport to execute trades on a Japanese market
but the Exchange itself has also carried out a surveillance on non-members
trading leveraged currency contracts. The reason behind that is fairly obvious
and that is that these people may at some stage wish to legitimise themselves
and get into the main stream of the futures industry in Australia. Therefore it
is necessary for the Exchange to know and be able to identify the people who
set up these operations so that it can take the necessary steps when they try to
legitimise themselves.
Anne Lampe has done a very good job at giving publicity to these
questionable operations, a couple of the companies had been in the paper on
and off for about six to eight months and then the Corporate Affairs
Commission succeeded in getting a receiver manager appointed to one of them.
Quite often the Exchange gets calls from members of the public about leveraged
currency dealers. I think it is unfortunate that people can be ripped off so easily.
They don’t even make basic inquiries. If I was going to invest in one of these
leveraged currency contracts one of the basic safeguards that I would take is to
at least ring up the Exchange or some other regulatory body and ask ‘Have you
heard of them?’ Obviously the Exchange can’t say ‘Oh, they are shonky, don’t
invest with them’ but the way you attack the problem is to point out the w‘rtues
of Exchange membership; are they licenced? are they a member of a self
regulatory organisation? what safeguards have you got if you lose your money?
can you arbitrate? For example, Sydney Futures Exchange has a system where
if you have a complaint against a member you don’t have to go to litigation
you can use the arbitration procedure which the Exchange offers. The Exchange
also offers a Fidelity Fund if the money has been fraudulently misappropriated.
Unfortunately people tend to see the dollar signs: these salesmen offer great
returns: and basic safeguards go out the window. People on occasions can’t get
down to the bank quick enough to draw their cheque, which I think is very
unfortunate and perhaps a poor reﬂection on the Australia investing public.
One of the other interesting things that I found about Anne Lampe’s
paper was this question of the telexes going off-shore and trying to establish to
the court that in fact the orders have never been placed. I am sure in some
companies it is just a big scam. When people come to me and say ‘Oh, but they
have telexes, they executed the orders’ my response is ‘Well, do you want me
to go downstairs and I will telex one out to so-and-so and give you the telex’.
I mean there is nothing in a telex. A telex is the easiest thing to forge.
What you need to do in these type of cases is look at what standard
broking practice and compare that to what these companies offer. Say, for
example, with the telexes. Standard broking practice is that orders are phoned
through. Even with overseas trading you phone it through and at the end of the
day you will do one or two things. Normally you will fax the conﬁrmations off
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saying ‘These are the orders we placed’ or else you will telex them off, but also
at the end of every month monthly statements come in issuing from the overseas
broker. In some of these companies where the allegation is that they are
bucketting the orders, that is they are not placing them on an Exchange, the
only thing you will ever see is a telex. Nothing more. No monthly statements,
no conﬁrmations at the end of the day and so you have to get across not only
to investors but also to the court that it is vitally important to compare what
these people do to what is standard practice, and if it varies from that then the
conclusion which they should draw with appropriate expert evidence, of course,
is that they are not conducting legitimate operations and they should be closed
down. One of the other things which I can very much identify with is the wall
thrown up by solicitors employed by leveraged currency dealers or other
companies. It can be incredibly frustrating when you send out letters seeking
certain information and what you get back is no answer. You get a letter back
from the solicitor saying ‘On what grounds? point to what power you can
request that information? Do this. Do that.’
In the earlier stages when the Exchange was handling some of these
matters it was causing problems but it has got to the stage now where, for
example, on Japanese markets the Exchange has a great deal of knowledge of
what actually takes place. So this throwing up the walls can in fact go against
these companies in the long run because the Exchange is in the position to know
what documentation should be there. We have got information from the
Japanese Exchanges and other sources. Trying to keep the Exchange in the dark
is no longer going to work. It is getting to the stage now where the Exchange is
in the position that it knows more about Japanese Exchanges than these people
who purport to execute trades on the Japanese Exchanges.
To return to my paper; What is a bucket-shop? A bucket-shop is a
company where they purport to execute the clients’ orders on a recognised
futures exchange when in fact they do not. The orders can end up in a bin
somewhere in Asia. I would view bucketting as the ultimate abuse on the futures
broker-client relationship. It is just a systematic and well organised form of
fraud.
I suppose the question that needs to be asked is ‘Why did people pick
Australia?’ I suppose one point which I did not put in the paper is that these
people at one time or another are eventually going to go to all countries in the
world and like it or not Australia is a wealthy country and they are going to
ﬁnally come here.
Bucket-shops are not a phenomena which is restricted to Australia.
Australia has seen it in the context that orders are purportedly being placed on
Japanese markets. The interesting thing is that the Japanese have an identical
problem. They are called ‘black ﬁrms’ in Japan. However, there they have not
got problems on their domestic market. There problems are with Japanese ﬁrms
who are purporting to execute trades on U.S. Exchanges as well English
Exchanges. So it is not as if this phenomena is restricted to Australia.
In the early eighties Hong Kong had similar problems as well as
Singapore. In fact if anyone saw the Four Corners programme about three or
four months ago they actually had extracts of that report from the Singapore
authority. I think it is rather unfortunate the regulatory authorities in Australia
weren’t advised that this type of operation was being conducted in Singapore
and had been closed down. It would have been a vital piece of information. Of
course, it would have given the regulatories in Australia an insight into what
they were doing and how they were doing it.
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The next thing is to look at some of the characteristics of these bucket-
shops. They are very smooth and well organised operations. They have very
plush ofﬁces. It is possible where clients are hesitating the salesmen will invite
them in. ‘Oh, come on in and have a look at our ofﬁce’. I mean they spare no
expense in ﬁtting them out and the people think ‘Oh, this must be fairly
respectable and they have got very good ofﬁces’. Customers also see all these
fancy screens, Reuters screens, and think ‘It must be quite a good operation. I
feel safe’ and the next thing they are parting with their money. I think it is just
simply part of their overall ploy.
Another one of their characteristics is that their salesmen are literally
hauled off the street. They are given about two days’ training and basically that
is an emphasis on how to sell futures as opposed to providing advice to the
clients and they get to the stage where they grossly misrepresent the proﬁts that
can be made ‘They say look. Give me $10,000 and in two weeks I will have
turned it into $20,000’ or ‘I had someone invest $5,000 with me the other day
and now they are up to $25,000.’ There is a constant emphasis on the proﬁts
never on the risks. Actually if you listen to their spiel you will ﬁnd that there
rarely, if ever, talk about any risks.
Another characteristic of them is that their client advisors are paid on
a commission only basis and the structure is such say, for example, if you trade
say one to ﬁfty contracts a month you might be paid $10 a trade. But if you
manage to do over 200 a month then you’re paid say $30 a trade. It is fairly
obvious that traders will build up their volume so that they get more money.
The dangers are fairly evident when they are paid on that basis.
Another thing that never ceases to amaze me that when you start reading
some of the client agreement forms that these companies offer. A number of
them actually have clauses in there which permit the company to bucket. The
agreement actually says they can take a principal position against their client.
I am sure that clause is never explained to clients and it can be done in a very
subtle way. One of the other jobs I have at the Exchange is I vet all client
agreement forms of all members so I have probably vetted somewhere between
eighty to one hundred of them and some of them are so subtle when you get a
bucketting clause in them. I can remember on one occasion when I read over
one and did not even pick it up and yet I had had considerable experience in
picking out that type of thing. I get quite annoyed when I see clauses like this
because the abuse that those clauses can be put to is fairly obvious. For example,
all clients sign a discretionary count or what is sometimes referred to as an
authorisation letter which basically gives the broker absolute authority to do
anything they like with that client’s money. There have been instances where
clients have phoned the company involved and said ‘Do not trade on my
account anymore. I want all my money back’ and the company went merrily
away and lost another $15,000 or $20,000 the next couple of days on that
client’s account. The solicitor’s letter to that client my say ‘Please go to clause
such and such of the client agreement form. You need to withdraw the brocker’s
authority in writing’. That is simply ridiculous and most unfortunate. I would
like to see one of those agreements challenged in court I suspect you could open
up under the Contracts Review Act in New South Wales.
The question which I suppose anyone is entitled to ask is “Why was it
allowed to ﬂourish so long in Australia?” It existed probably for about 18
months to two years prior effective action being taken. I think one of the
important things is that there was a void in the legislation. I think the Corporate
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Affairs Commission prior to the 1st July 1986 which was the effective date of
the Futures Industry Code did not think that what these people were offering
were a prescribed interest. It only actually came out later in the leverage
currencies cases that what they were offering in fact was a prescribed interest,
but those actions taken late last year and early this year were taken both under
the Futures Industry Code and the Companies Code. I have considered the
question: would they have succeeded prior to the lst July 1986 on the
Companies Code alone? The feeling is that they would not have because I think
one of the things which perhaps inﬂuenced the courts indirectly is that it became
publicised in the press exactly what the types of operations these people carried
out and it subtly has inﬂuenced the judges and their thinking.
Again, people did not realise they were being ripped off. When they
complained to the broker, the broker could produce the magical telexes to say
that the orders were placed, and quite often the response they give is ‘Eighty-
ﬁve percent of people who trade futures lose money’. I think perhaps that is
one of the greatest excuses ever invented for this type of operation. What they
fail to say is of course 99 percent of their people are losing money. Additionally
clients just did not know they were being ripped off and it wasn’t until the
papers brought it to their attention they began to think ‘Oh yes, the same thing
happened to me’. I am intrigued how some people did not complain to the
Corporate Affairs Commission or the Sydney Futures Exchange. Obviously the
Exchange was restricted if it was a non-member.
The next point is why they used a foreign exchange. I think basically
the points are made in my paper. Australian investors are not familiar with the
Japanese market. There are language barriers. The problem of establishing court
audit trails overseas. What happens is the telex does not go straight to Japan.
The telex goes perhaps through Singapore, Hong Kong, and could go through
up to two intermediaries before it is ﬁnally telexed to Japan itself. It is fairly
obvious why they do that. That is you lose the audit trail, and they sit back
being quite smug about it and they are thinking that ‘Oh well, the Exchange or
whoever it is has to prove we did not place them’. If we lose the audit trail we
cannot take any action against them. These people are very skilled in what they
do. The great difficulty from an evidentiary point of view in running these cases
is trying to prove a negative. You go into the court and you say ‘Standard
broking practice is that an audit trail should be there. There is no order trail.
The conclusion that we are asking you to draw then is the orders were not
placed’. A very difficult argument to run in court. Obviously the judge is going
to have some doubts. It could be legitimate or it might not be.
They can pretty much identify with the last topic—problems faced by
the regulators is being employable by the Exchange. It has a co-regulatory role
under the Futures Industry Code with the Corporate Affairs Commission and
they are fairly brief and speak for themselves.
In conclusion I should say that by far the quickest and the most efficient
way of closing down these operations is to stop their money ﬂow. The best way
to do that is to give them bad publicity. Once their cash ﬂow is severely
interrupted they close up very quickly.
I think perhaps on a brighter note, the question is ‘Are we going to see
a continuation of this kind of activity, leveraged currency dealers and some
companies which purport to trade on Japanese markets?’ My feeling is ‘No, we
are not’. As far as I know most companies who traded Japanese markets and,
of course, it does not mean that all companies that trade Japanese markets are
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fraudulent, but there are very few that trade Japanese markets anymore. The
American experience has shown once you get rid of one form they are likely to
develop another. Perhaps because the leverage of the contracts is such that a
small outlay can get you a large proﬁt so it is just it has the characteristics of ,
attracting these money merchants and fraudulent people. The only way to try
and combat that, is for regulators to‘have a high proﬁle and show these people
that there is somebody there who will take action against them and make them
think twice before they ever try that type of activity in Australia.
7 6
DISCUSSION
Question .
I have a question for Michael Hains. In the situation where an associate
member of Sydney Futures Exchange closes down and threatens to go back, say,
to Malaysia and all the moneys are camped in Malaysia, have you got a
compensation fund? How soon does the compensation fund pay out to the
investing public?
Michael Hains
The question is ﬁrst of all it is not an automatic payout from the Fidelity
Fund or under any Act, either the Futures Industry Code or the Securities
Industry Code. It is ﬁrst necessary to submit a claim. But let’s assume there is
a claim. Given your example I,do not know how long it would take. It would
depend on how long before you could establish whether or not the moneys are
recoverable from Malaysia. You would need to make certain enquiries in
Malaysia, for example, to go to their regulators and present the factual situation
to them and ask ‘What are you going to do?’ That of course takes time. After
you have done that you would then need to assess the likelihood of success in
litigation against any company that may be in Malaysia, and after you have
considered those two options then you would be better informed to make a
decision on whether the payment should be made out. It may take 12 to 18
months.
John Jeﬂerson, Corporate Affairs Commission
My question is to the whole panel. Is there any particular legislation that
they would like changed, or, any additional legislation, or any extension to the
regulations that would help prevent corporate crime or would help in policing
corporate crime?
Jim Berry
From the Stock Exchange point of view we would be much happier if
there was complete protection to the self regulatory organisation to have
complete and open communication between the Commission and the Exchange
so that no defamatory action could be taken. That is one basic thing I believe
is necessary.
Michael Hains
I have to support Jim Berry on that. Of course, the Sydney Futures
Exchange is a self regulatory organisation as well. There are two problems that
have to be faced. One of the problems is that you cannot often be as honest as
you would like in correspondence with the fear that it will be subpoenaed into
court. In the not too distant future I am actually going to do research looking
at the basis upon which public interest immunity is based. For example, the
Corporate Affairs Commission can rely upon that when they are subpoenaed '
for documents. I am going to see whether the same sort of principles could ever
apply for correspondence between two self regulatory organisations. I suspect
that it does not but it is certainly something that we need.
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Another thing which I think is vitally important is the secrecy provisions
which bind both the National Companies and Securities Commission and
Corporate Affairs Commission. They have changed slightly so that they can
more freely give us information. It can get to a situation where you are at one
way street, i.e., going from the self regulatory organisation to Corporate Affairs.
Corporate Affairs are more than willing to assist but they are bound under the
statutes by which they are constituted not to make certain documents available.
That can be overcome on occasions when the Commissioner gives consent, but
it can take time to get that consent. Permitting them to release documents a
little more freely to self regulatory organisations would be a great step forward.
Terry Griﬂin
Could I just make a general comment on that to justify my place on
this panel.
It seems to be that there are any number of changes that any prosecutor
could run off. There are ways of making the ﬁght against organised crime more
effective—forcing people to incriminate themselves would be a pretty useful
one. But it has to be a balance quite obviously, and one of the things that it
seems to me that many of the speakers have put forward is that there is an
education problem. The balance has to be that which the community seeks
between the power it gives its investigators and the rights of the individual. I
do not think anybody here or any regulatory authority is going to or should be
able to say ‘We want these rights and we want ’em now’. But the important
thing is to have the public in the position where they understand the problem,
and then decide what powers they are going to give the law enforcement
agencies to meet the problem. War is a good example. In wartime a lot of civil
liberties and individual rights disappear and people generally agree it is in their
best interests. In times when there are not those severe threats people are not
prepared to let their rights go so freely. I think the job of people who are
concerned and have some knowledge is to educate, and then ﬁnd out where the
public want to draw the line. I think that is the basic problem at the moment.
Robert Nicol
Ifl might just respond in relation to my paper which was on insider
trading which I dealt with solely.
I think there has to be a change to s. 128 of the Securities Industry Code.
I would like to see something along the lines of the draft proposed by Dr
Anisman in his paper Insider Australian Legislation for Australia—The Outline
of the Issues and Alternatives. It is a Green Paper and I can only refer to what
I said earlier and draw your attention to the English legislation which I said at
the time is novel. If you read the paper later you might care to think just what
the English have done at this particular stage in relation to the extreme that
they have gone to with their legislation.
Professor Brent Fisse, Director, Institute of Criminology
I would like to ask a question in particular of Brian Rowe and Terry
Grifﬁn in relation to some of the problems about criminal prosecution which
they discussed in their paper. Obviously there are a large number of difﬁculties
associated with successfully using the criminal process in areas such as complex
fraud. That leads one to ask to what extent should we be relying more and more
on civil liability and the civil process as a means of at least doing something
to control the villains of the piece?
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Bryan Rowe
I think you are right. There are a number of difficulties with the major
fraud cases which we have highlighted in our paper. There is a View around
that in some instances it is much better to get the money back than to just put
the criminal in gaol for a couple of years.
In the Federal arena there may not be a need to do anything more as
the penalties are quite good for conspiracy to defraud—they have gone from 3
years to 20 years. Primarily, I believe that there was never an offence to defraud
the Commonwealth on your own. There is now, and the maximum penalty is
10 years. The criminal penalties may now be seen as effective. But I think there
is a need to use civil powers either on their own or in conjunction with the
criminal ones. We are seeing greater successes in the combination of civil
remedies initiatives as well as the prosecution initiatives. I was glancing at the
Sydney Morning Herald, I think this morning or yesterday, where it appears '
that one of the potential witnesses in an enquiry has slipped off to England,
presumably to stay away for a couple of years then come back when it has all
blown over. Allegedly the Tax Ofﬁce yesterday froze all his assets including a
$1.2 million dollar Gold Coast unit. Now, that may have an effect, of either
bringing him back or making him live in somewhat lower circumstances while
he is away. But I do agree that the civil remedies initiative is the one that should
be pursued. We all should be trying to ensure that the necessary legislation both
here and overseas is put intotplace because the criminals do not obey the
boundaries like we do and also we cannot take effective action unless the other
countries reciprocate. It is not just a matter of passing legislation in Australia.
The legislation has got to be in place overseas as well and there should be a
major effort to get that legislation in place as soon as possible.
Robert Nicol
Could I just respond to that? When the Futures Industry Code came in
on the 1 July 1986 the Corporate Affairs Commission had powers to get
receivers appointed under the Code as well as criminal sanctions. It was a
resolution that we made at the Commission that we would ﬁrstly go with the
much 'Speedier civil remedies of having a receiver appointed. It was quite
effective. During the last financial year we had twenty-three receivers appointed,
most of them over the leveraged currency dealers’ actions. Now we ﬁnd we have
to put the criminal briefs together which is a little bit harder and slower but it
was effective in the ﬁrst instance. We were not aiming at all leveraged currency
dealers but those that were ﬂouting the law, bucket shops etc., getting them
closed down and trying to protect investors’ funds.
Patricia McMahon, Law Student
I would like to ask Robert Nicol. Where do you draw the line of insider
trading? Surely it is unrealistic to expect companies and officers to trade blind
on the market, and what do you think of Chinese Wall arrangements within
companies? -
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Robert Nicol
The legislation must draw the line. If I could just refer to the current
legislation. You see 5.128 subsection (1)—
a person connected with a body corporate shall not deal in securities of a
body corporate etc., etc., if he is in possession of information not generally
available but if it were would be likely to materially affect the price of those
securities.
It is virtually up to the court, isn’t it, to interpret that section and draw
the line.
I can only go on the legislation and that is what the legislation says.
Anisman is his Green Paper takes it a lot further in that he deﬁnes, what an
insider is, the particular categories of insider at s. 11E and then at s. 31.
An insider of a company who knows material conﬁdentialinformation
relating to a company or security of a company shall not purchase or sell
a security of a company or an option or other right to purchase or sell such
security.
So there is a complete embargo, and then there are three sections
comprising subsections all giving him defences, ways out. So there is an embargo
but there are defences, the onus virtually shifts then to the defendant.
Patricia McMahon
One member of the panel mentioned there was a lot- of information_
circulating in the market place. Wouldn’t that be regard as price sensitive
information?
Robert Nicol
Once it becomes public it takes it out of the realm of ‘would be likely
to materially aﬁect’. ‘If there is a rumor in the marketplace, and people generally
know about, it, then it falls under the current s. 128. He is in possession of that
which is generally known.
The other thing that the Anisman Paper does is it deﬁnes information
to be a ‘fact, intention, opinion, motive, and a statement concerning such
matter’, whereas the current legislation just says ‘information’—there is no
deﬁnition of it.
Jim Berry
Could I just take your question just a little bit further? The Securities
Institute submission to the N.C.S.C. on insider trading says that it does not
matter what the association is, it is the information that causes the damage,
rather than precisely how it is obtained or who obtains it. Therefore the
legislation could be much simpliﬁed by preparing an appropriate deﬁnition of
what falls under the heading ‘conﬁdential information’, i.e., information that is
price sensitive and conﬁdential. Accordingly any person broadly deﬁned who
uses such conﬁdential information should be caught by the legislation. We
basically took the tack that it is not the relationship, it is the use of the
information and so therefore we had great difﬁculty with Professor Anisman’s
approach. We saw from practitioners in the market that the proposed legislation
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created such confusion in the way that it was structured—how really could a
stockbroker who had Chinese Walls in place work out through the deﬁnition of
insider, whether in fact he was an insider, so we took the ethical approach to
say that if you have the information you should not use it.
Your second part of the question is about Chinese Walls. The Exchange
instituted a rule on the lst March 1984 as regards Chinese Walls which is the
ﬁrst time this ethical matter was put into the Rules. I think that it is quite
effective in the professional type organisations, those people who go to great
lengths to ensure that they have adequate security resources in place between
two physically different parts of their organisations. In certain instances I have
found that there might be a corporate Chinese Wall around, say, a corporate
ﬁnance department, and that the corporate ﬁnance department of a stockbroker
decided to take a major position in a listed company and that position might
be held for six, nine or twelve months. Now, obviously the Chinese Wall needs
to be extremely good to keep the information conﬁdential to the corporate
ﬁnance department for that length of time because in that length of time the
broker has to carry on his other activities. Most likely, if it is a specialist stock,
he would be producing. research reports in which he would have
recommendations on that stock, as well as on companies that might be
associated with it. He also might have client advisers who are making
recommendations on that stock. I have looked at Chinese Walls situations in
the larger brokers and I have found them to be largely effective. It is then a
fascinating process how the conﬁdential information in effect breaks down over
a period of time because of rumors in the market. Let us say the broker is
dealing as principal in selling off the stock. Therefore the market puts two and
two together, and the professionals come to the conclusion that that broker has
a principal position. It then starts to become non-conﬁdential information
because of the types of rumors that are going around in the market. It might
then come back to a client adviser on the other side of the Chinese Wall where
he is asked ‘Well, hasn’t your ﬁrm got a large principal position in this
company?’ It is a very complex area. I am not going to say it works in every
case but in the larger ﬁrms that have actively pursued putting in Chinese Walls
I have seen it work. I have also seen where it does not work so well and I would
suggest it is more a problem of how does a two partner partnership work with
this side saying, ‘I have got this information’ and that side saying ‘No, I can’t
tell the other person about it’.
Dr JeﬂSulton, Director, Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
I feel as if I am not a member of the Club—I do not know what Chinese
Walls are. It does seem a bit like a Club. I am looking at it from the point of
view of a person who is mainly concerned with, what I suppose I would call
traditional crime, in which a number of people commit property crimes and
the like and keep doing it even though they get locked up for longer and longer
periods of time. They are usually classiﬁable in certain classes of the society—
males, young, etc. Now in all of the time that I have been involved with the
Bureau we have only done one study on corporate crime, and it was quite a
long time ago. One of the things which struck me, and I am no expert since I
do not know anything about Chinese Walls, was that we are dealing with a very
different type of activity from armed robbery and the like because everybody
recognises an armed robbery when they see it. There is no dispute about it.
Nobody says ‘Well I just came in to take some money out or to deposit
something’ if they are carrying a gun and wearing a balaclava. In this case it is
different.
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What I think you have to answer as a panel is why it is you are so
patently unsuccessful in dealing with the offences which you describe. If you
tackle it as if it were traditional crime then you would deﬁne these offences.
The offences that you have deﬁned are so obscure that it is awfully difﬁcult to
know whether they have happened or not. There were examples read from an
Act which showed that it was not clear or obvious what had occurred, whereas
that is not true of the Crimes Act in general, with respect to traditional offences.
What I would suggest is that one of the problems is that there is an
assumption which underlies the enforcement approach which has been used,
and that is that, somehow or other, what is going on is an ordinary type of
activity—an entrepreneural behaviour that you or I or anyone of us could just
do if we chose to. Tomorrow we could go out and do all the things that you
have described—get involved with the Futures Exchange and so on. That is not
true, we can’t do that sort of thing. It is not part of normal entrepreneural
activity. Sure, I could barter down in the marketplace if there was one. There
are some purists say ‘Well, that is what this is all about, so you have got to
encourage entrepreneural behaviour”.
I would suggest from the little reading I have done of the Companies
Act that enormous protections have been developed for people who operate
companies. There are special privileges involved with it. It is not a one to one
situation which has evolved from simple market dealings. It is something which
is quite different—more like driving a car. Where I drive a car and use public
roads which have been built at enormous expense and because of the privilege
of being able to drive a car on public roads I have to have a licence and submit
to a test, etc. I do not think the tests are good enough and, of course, we still
continue to kill each other, so there is not enough stringent action with respect
to driving. There is even less it seems to me with respect to the companies and
their operations. Directors are not required to pass tests, they are not required
to submit themselves to periodical examinations, they are not required to
participate in disclosure other than that which is speciﬁed in Annual Reports
and the like which is really not enough to determine whether or not what they
have done has been carried out in any sort of any ethical manner. Self regulation
is all very well but this is an enormous privilege we have given these people
and many of them have run away with it and cost many people who cannot
afford a great deal of money. They may be foolish, very foolish, but there are
many others who may have been less foolish who have, in total, lost millions
of dollars too.
Penalties If somebody walked into a bank and comes out with $25,000
and threatens with an armed weapon, and they are caught they are likely to go
down for 15-20 years, something like that. I am not in favour of enormous
penalties, the evidence does not particularly support the deterrent effect of very
large penalties in the sorts of traditional crime that we deal with. On the other
hand, in this area it seems we have got an absurd situation where it is at the
other extreme.
I wonder whether or not it is hard for me to get a leverage on this whole
debate because I feel I should belong to the Club and then I would all be able
to talk like you about the details of things: whether or not there is a Chinese
Wall, whether or not somebody is engaging in insider trading, calculated on
what must be a model of obscurity in the Act in deﬁning it. But then, I would
not be dealing with the overall problem. I would like to put it to you that
perhaps the whole thing should be turned on its head. It should be a privilege
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to work in the area that you are working in. When people break that privilege
they should be put out of it like the Medical Board puts out a practitioner who
behaves badly.
Jim Berry
Firstly a Chinese Wall is basically a procedure which is installed in
broking or other ﬁnancial institutions which stops the ﬂow of information from
one side of the organisation to the other. It is commonly used for takeover
activity whereby, let us say, a bank is advising in a capacity a takeover or
advising a person taking over another to ensure information that is gained in
that section of the bank’s activity cannot ﬂow to other areas. If a bank was
advising the BHP board on a takeover and a loan officer out in a Branch
approved an application for a loan to somebody who wanted to buy 1000 BHP
shares, it must be effective. Essentially it is an ethical barrier to protect both
clients of the bank to ensure that the information received on the takeover by
the bank is not misused by the bank and also to ensure that the person who is
approving the loan to the investor is not aware that there is a takeover offer in
process.
Just going back to your points. I would disagree. I would say that the
Stock Exchanges have been successful self regulators. Since Patrick Partners in
1975 there really have not been any great scams. Therefore the industry has
regulated its own. I would say that in many cases if there is an unsavoury
operator he is removed by whatever means. I think it is probably a pity that
the public are not made aware of our disciplinary procedures because we are
publicity shy. But I am convinced that self regulation is effective because it
attacks the problem quickly. It is in the interests of the professionals to do so.
Robert Nicol
I suppose it may fall to me to answer part of the question as 1 am from
Corporate Affairs. You see the whole point of my paper was to draw your
attention to the current insider position and the proposed Draft. It has been
perceived in the past that s. 128 is not working that is why the N.C.S.C.
commissioned this Draft Report and that is why it is here and it is being
considered at this particular stage. It does change the whole perspective of
insider trading and I believe will make it easier to prosecute.
You drew the analogy with armed robbers. That is easy, but are all
armed robbers caught? You know there must be a little bit of spillage. You draw
the analogy of the armed robbery and that the Crimes Act offences are clear,
but there is an offence I believe in the Crimes Act around about 5. 98 of ‘armed
robbery with an offensive weapon’. Well, what is an offensive weapon? Is the
law on that particular area clear? The law is a ﬂuid thing. You have said that
to be a director is a right. You know what questions do you have to answer
etc., etc., and then you said well ‘Look at a licence you have got to answer
questions’. What question really do you have to answer to renew a licence. You
do not have to go for another test or a medical test until you are 70. I do not
think you will find that the licencing of directors or getting people appointed
as directors any different. There are provisions in the Act to have directors
disqualiﬁed. That is s. 562A, and s. 562A is being actively pursued now. The
Companies Code was only amended in March last year and this provision was
put in place but it is being used. So I believe that the Act is being used and
being enforced and I do not think your jaundiced view is quite right.
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Terry Grzﬁin
Could I comment on that at general level to develop a little bit. It seems
to me that, with respect, there is a classic mistake in what your are saying, and
that is that we up here ought to be making the laws so that the naughty or not
so naughty directors can be caught. We are not the lawmakers. We are
commentators and the lawmakers are the people—all of you—and it goes back
to that point of education and getting the laws you want.
But I think there was an even greater ﬂaw and Mr Nicol alluded to it.
It seemed to me that you were saying the simple, clear cut matters where the
penalties are severe and the crime is obvious are easily controlled. Now, if you
make company type law tight and put the death penalty on people for not
signing their documents properly, get it really tough, that will change the
situation. Of course it is not the case—there are still murderers, armed robbers.
The penalties and the description of the crimes has done nothing to stop those
crimes. There will be no description or controls that you can draw that will stop
these crimes. You can perhaps have different reactions to the crime but it is
not going to stop them. I do not think that the analogy of privilege and licence
works very well either for the same reasons. You can build in as many tests as
you like. Greed which is a driving factor in most of these corporate commerical
organised frauds will drive people regardless of the penalties. You see with the
drug offences where often, at least in the federal area, there is a life sentence.
It does not even slow people down.
John Swan, Crown Prosecutor (Companies)
I might say from the outset that the reason why many of the Crown
Prosecutors do not come down from Darlinghurst to our area in ADC. House
is for the very reason that Dr Sutton has adverted to: that is, it is much easier
to prove a crime of armed robbery or assault.
One of the great difﬁculties in proving a corporate crime case is the
difficulty of proof of documents. There is the huge documentation that is
amassed in all these corporate crime matters. When we go up to court we take
boxes of documents. We literally have to go through the whole history of the
operation of the company. We have to prove every entry that is relevant in the
books. We have to call not only :the investigators of Corporate Affairs
Commission but the accountants who have been through the books for the
purposes of identiﬁcation, etc., etc., and by the time we try to explain all this
to the jury half of them have gone to sleep because it is very, very difficult to
try and explain to them various entries, to trace what was misappropriated by
company directors or other officers and where the money went and for what
purpose etc., etc. Now the difficulty in these cases really is not ‘What is fraud?’.
‘What is fraud?’ is very easy to explain to the jury because as has been stated
in many authorities of the Supreme Court, fraud is nothing more than
dishonesty, and it is very easy for the jury to see whether there has been
dishonesty in any corporate crime case. Where the difficulty lies is where
technical objections are taken, and where delay after delay is almost, I would
say, ‘orchestrated’ by defending counsel. The longer the case takes the better.
The more often the jury are trotted out by the trial judge the more annoyed
they get and they lose track of what the case is about. What we really need for
the purposes of simplifying the process is to get the legislation, the Evidence
, Act, amended. Nothing more. Where we can, we should obtain an expert who
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could go through the books and records of the corporation and give his expert
view as to the entries and the results (and that should take probably about half
an hour to an hour) rather than go through masses of documentation and get
everybody bored with the case from the ﬁrst couple of days.
One other comment I have with regard to directors and that is in the
context of the need to amend the legislation. I realise that it is diﬂicult to put
a test to prospective directors because if you make it too hard they would
probably ﬁnd someone who would be prepared for a fee to become a director
subject to meeting the qualiﬁcations of the new test. But the real deterrent factor
would be to impose personal liability on the directors if the company has failed
after, say, it being in operation for 18 months; and you usually ﬁnd that people
who set up these ﬂy by night companies only set them up for 18 months—never
bother to ﬁle a return, transmit the assets overseas and they go after the assets
themselves.
Paul Byme, New South Wales Law Reform Commission
My question will be brief. It is really directed towards Brian Rowe and
Terry Griﬂin, because it derives from a comment in the paper which they
presented, but it may be something which Anne Lampe might wish to comment
about
I have got some reservations about one thing Brian Rowe and Terry
Grifﬁn have said, namely that the only effective answer lies in ensuring that the
public are aware of the facts ‘—for what it is worth we believe the media have
the power and a responsibility to provide those facts’. It seems to me that that
is a matter for some concern because, particularly in this sort of area, what'are
the facts will very much be a question of a subjective nature. What are put
forward as facts may not be anything more than opinions. I wonder whether
you have any comment as to how you can reconcile the approach that you have
put forward with the traditional right of an accused person to be protected
against prejudicial inﬂuences prior to trial. I wonder in particular whether the
experience that we have had in this country with the Costigan Commission and
its comments in relation to Kerry Packer might lead you to temper the
comments that you have made on this point?
Bryan Rowe
I think I should say that Terry and I are not saying publicity in the sense
of putting the face of Brian Maher and whoever else on the front of the papers.
We are saying publicity to let the public know that corporate fraud is here, does
exist and is costing a lot of money, and you ought to get off your backsides and
do something about it rather than just quoting ﬁgures from the Australia Card
debate that we used. I do not think either Terry or I would like to prejudice in
any way the right of an accused to a fair trial. Whatever our views are, that can
only be counterproductive in the long term because if it is found that there was
prejudice there will be a re-trial and these cases take months to prepare, months
to run, so I do not think we really advocate that sort of publicity, the police
taking the media with them to the search warrants and that sort of thing. What
is needed is really an awareness to elevate the public’s consciousness so that
they will then demand that proper laws are introduced, or proper resources are
given. Then it is a matter of balancing what rights you give, what rights you
take away and that will come about by the public deciding how far they want
to go.
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I do not think I have a problemonce people are convicted and their
appeal processes are ﬁnished and they are in gaol. Somebody can run an article
about them. I do agree with you that it is a very diﬂicult problem. How you
ever run a bottom of the harbour article for example over the last 4 years when
there have been trials and committals going on at some stage virtually the whole
time is difﬁcult. his a very fine line to draw and you know it takes a great
balancing act but I do think the public has a certain right to know.
Anne Lampe
I think the defamation laws in fact protect people fairly well. We have
to run through hoops and rings to say the sorts of things that we would like to
say about people’s activities. You have also got to remember that once people
are charged there is very little we can say. We can say nothing until they get
into court and then we can only report on what is said in court until such time
as they are convicted, and then we can give some background. But we face fairly
tough restrictions on what we can say.
What I would like to add is that I think everybody focuses on the rights
of the individual who is charged until he is proven guilty. There are a whole
lot of innocent people out there who lose money and were victims, and who
also have a right to information and have a right to airing their grievances.
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